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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this appeal from the
judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon County, State of Utah,
dated June 2, 2000, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953 as
amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err by finding that James Brockbank and Cheryl
Rachele committed fraud under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, when James
assigned his right to redeem property which was sold by Penny Brockbank at an
execution sale, and when the assignee of the right of redemption, Cheryl Rachele
exercised that right by paying to Penny the redemption price, which Penny herself
established as the sole bidder at the execution sale?
Standard of Review. This issue concerns legal conclusions that were
decided by the trial court upon cross motions for summary judgment. Therefore, it
is reviewed for correctness, Board of Educ. of Alpine School Dist v. Ward, 974
P.2d 824, 825 (Utah 1999), with no deference given to the trial court's ruling,
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029,
1030 (Utah 1995).
This issue was preserved in Cheryl's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Record at 1338.)

1

2. Did the trial court err when it rescinded an allegedly fraudulent
conveyance and then allowed the party claiming fraud to retain the benefit of the
allegedly fraudulent conveyance?
Standard of Review. This issue concerns legal conclusions that were
decided by the trial court upon cross motions for summary judgment. Therefore, it
is reviewed for correctness, Board of Educ. of Alpine School Dist. v. Ward, 974
P.2d 824, 825 (Utah 1999), with no deference given to the trial court's ruling,
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029,
1030 (Utah 1995).
This issue was preserved in Cheryl's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Record at 1338.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS
The determinative statutes are reproduced in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal arising from a final order entitled "Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law Concerning Cross Motions for Summary Judgment by Third
Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant." This final order granted Penny
Brockbank 's motion for summary judgment and found that the assignment of the
right of redemption was a fraudulent transfer, even though Penny, the "defrauded"
party, initiated the foreclosure proceeding and then accepted the full redemption
2

price and continues to retain that benefit. This order was signed June 2, 2000 by
the Seventh Judicial District Court, Judge Bruce K. Halliday, presiding.
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below
In a Supplemental Decree dated February 18, 1998, Penny Brockbank was
awarded a judgment in the amount of $42,832.88 against James Brockbank. The
Supplemental Decree also awarded certain real property referred to as "the 48 East
Property" to James and awarded Penny a lien on James's real property to secure
Penny's judgment. The 48 East property had an approximate value of $45,000.
Subsequently, Penny caused a writ of execution to be issued which resulted in a
sheriffs sale conducted by the sheriff of Carbon County on December 23, 1998 of
the 48 East Property. Penny credit bid $15,000 of her judgment against James for
that property.
Shortly thereafter, on January 5, 1999, James assigned his right of
redemption, pursuant to Rule 69, to his friend, Cheryl Rachele for $50. Cheryl
then redeemed the property by delivering a check for the amount of $16,653—the
principal amount of the bid, the statutory interest surcharge, and attorney's fees—
to the order of both Penny and the sheriff that conducted the sale, ensuring that she
complied with Rule 69(j)(2). Penny accepted this money without objection, fully
aware of the transfer between James and Cheryl. Penny's judgment against James
was credited the amount of $15,000 in an order dated May 9, 1999.
On January 6, 1999, Penny added Cheryl as a third party defendant to the
divorce proceeding between Penny and James, claiming fraud in James's transfer
3

of the right of redemption to Cheryl.1 On or about December 23, 1999, Penny
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Against Third Party Defendant. On or
about January 21, 2000, Cheryl filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. On
June 2, 2000, the court granted Penny's summary judgment motion, denied
Cheryl's summary judgment motion, transferred the property to James, and
entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from which this appeal is
taken.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This appeal arises out of a complex fact situation arising from a

divorce action between Respondent James Brockbank and Petitioner/Third Party
Plaintiff Penny Brockbank. (Record at 1, 480.)
2.

On or about February 18, 1998, a Supplemental Decree was entered

in that action, and, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the decree, James was awarded
certain property, including the real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price,
Utah (hereinafter "the 48 East Property"). (Record at 289, 292.)
3.

The Supplemental Decree also awarded Penny a judgment in the

approximate amount of $42,832.88 against James. (Record at 294.) This
judgment was affirmed in Brockbank Appeal # 1.

1

Penny also issued an order to show cause to find James in contempt for assigning
the right of redemption, contending that the assignment violated the court's order
restraining James form taking any action to convey or pledge the real property
awarded to him. This court declined to address whether the assignment of the
right of redemption was a conveyance or pledge of real property when the issue
was before it on James's 2nd appeal.
4

4.

Under the Decree, Penny was awarded a lien against all of James'

real property. (Record at 294.)
5.

Penny caused a Writ of Execution to be levied on James' 48 East

Property, which was valued at $45,000. (Record at 944.)
6.

At the sheriffs sale of the 48 East Property—which occurred on

December 23, 1998—Penny, the sole bidder, credit bid the amount of Fifteen
Thousand ($15,000). (Record at 491.)
7.

At that time, the mortgage remaining on the 48 East Property was

approximately $2,000 to $3,000. (Record at 944, ^ 4.)
8.

Following the sheriffs sale, Penny took possession of the 48 East

Property. (Record at 945, ^ 8.)
9.

James did not have the funds available to exercise his right of

redemption, so he assigned the right of redemption to Third Party Defendant
Cheiyl Rachele. (Record at 945-946,ffif9,10.)
10.

Cheryl paid James $50 for the Assignment of the Right of

Redemption. (Record at 485.)
11.

On January 5, 1999, Cheryl, using her credit cards and other

available sources, redeemed the 48 East Property from Penny for $16,653, which
included the bid price of $15,000, plus interest and attorney fees. (Record at 486487.)
12.

Penny accepted the amount of $16,653 as the redemption price of

that property. (Record at 860-861.)
5

13.

Thereafter, Cheryl took possession and control of the 48 East

Property. (Record at 1116, page 123, Ins. 17-18.)
14.

On January 6, 1999, Penny added Cheryl as a third party defendant

in Penny's divorce action. Penny claimed that James' assignment of the right of
redemption to Cheryl was a fraudulent transfer, and ought to be voided. (Record
at 480.)
15.

Notwithstanding Penny's third party complaint, Penny credited her

judgment against James for the redemption amount of $ 15,000. (Record at 860861.)
16.

At no time has Penny returned or attempted to return or tender the

amount of the redemption price to Cheryl. (Record at 1343, ^ 19.)
17.

The trial court, pursuant to Penny's Motion for an Order to Show

Cause, held James in contempt for deeding the Property to Cheryl, on the basis
that the deed violated the court's previous order restraining James from conveying
or pledging his real property. (Record at 911.)
18.

James appealed the finding of contempt on the grounds that the right

of redemption is not a real property interest and that he could not convey or pledge
the real property after Penny purchased it at the sheriffs sale. Despite thorough
briefing on the issues, the court's opinion did not address whether James's
assignment of the right of redemption was a conveyance or pledge of real
property. Brockbank appeal # 2; Appellate No. 980113.
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19.

While James' appeal was pending, Penny filed a motion for

summary judgment against Cheryl. Penny sought to set aside the assignment of
the right of redemption and subsequent redemption of the property as fraudulent
transfers. (Record at 1193.)
20.

Cheryl filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the grounds

that Penny had waived any objection to the assignment and ratified the redemption
by accepting and retaining the redemption price paid by Cheryl. (Record at 1338.)
21.

The trial court issued a ruling on June 2, 2000, in which it denied

Cheryl's motion and granted Penny's. The final order was also entered on June 2,
2000. (Record at 1507.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Relying upon the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the trial court found,
upon cross motions for summary judgment, that James Brockbank's assignment of
his right to redeem the 48 East Property was fraudulent. A close look at the
language of the Act and at the nature of a right of redemption reveals, however,
that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Penny's Motion for
Summaiy Judgment and denying Cheryl's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Act allows a creditor to sue a debtor who seeks to shield assets from
judgment by transferring the assets to another party. Penny, relying upon the Act,
contends that James sought to hinder her claim by assigning his right to redeem
the 48 East Property. However, a right of redemption is not an interest in real
property; it is a longstanding right that affords debtors protection from over
7

zealous and oppressive creditors. Thus, when a sheriff sells a debtor's assets to
satisfy a creditor's lien, the debtor may redeem the assets. To redeem assets, the
debtor must pay the creditor the amount for which the assets were sold. Also, a
right of redemption is transferable. Since a creditor received the money she was
owed, exercising a right of redemption is not fraudulent as a matter of law—even
if the original debtor or some assignee is the individual who exercises the right of
redemption.
In the present case, Penny cannot claim that transferring the right of
redemption hindered, delayed, or defrauded her ability to collect the debt owed to
her because she was paid the money upon execution of the judgment lien and sale
of the 48 East Property. Additionally, James did not act with the actual intent to
defraud Penny by assigning his right of redemption to Cheiyl. In fact, James paid
the remainder of the judgment that he owed Penny subsequent to the redemption
of the 48 East Property by selling other property that he owned. Because the
assignment of a right of redemption cannot, as a matter of law, hinder, delay, or
defraud a creditor, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act does not apply to James's
assignment of the right of redemption. Therefore, the trial court erred by granting
Penny's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Additionally, because Penny accepted and continues to retain the money
that Cheiyl paid to her as the redemption price of the 48 East Property, Penny
waived any objection she may have had to the assignment of the right of
redemption. The law clearly does not allow an allegedly defrauded party to keep
8

the benefits of the purportedly fraudulent contract and to simultaneously have the
contract declared void. Astoundingly, this is exactly what the trial court did—
declaring the assignment of the right of redemption void and allowing Penny to
keep the money that Cheryl paid to her in exercising the right of redemption.
Clearly, the trial court erred as a matter of law by not granting Cheryl's Motion for
Summaiy Judgment, dismissing Penny's third party complaint, and quieting title
to the property in Cheryl.
ARGUMENT
Summaiy judgment should only be granted when "there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). The trial court's legal
conclusions made in granting or denying a motion for summary judgment,
including the conclusion that there are no genuine issues of material fact, are
reviewed for correctness, Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v.
Campbell 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992), with no deference given to the
trial court's conclusions, Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108,
1112 (Utah 1991). Obviously, when the party that was granted summary
judgment by the trial court was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the
trial court's decision must be reversed. Conversely, when the party whose cross
motion for summaiy judgment was denied was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, their motion must be granted. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c).
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I.

IT WAS ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR THE TRIAL
COURT TO GRANT PENNY BROCKBANK'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT CANNOT APPLY TO THE
ASSIGNMENT OF A RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.
Penny Brockbank's proposed construction of the law would essentially

declare every transfer of a right of redemption fraudulent. Such a construction
flies in the face of hundreds of years of protection that the common law has given
debtors through the right to redeem property that has been sold to satisfy the claim
of a creditor. Relying upon the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 25-6-1 et seq., the trial court held that James Brockbank's assignment of his
right to redeem the 48 East Property to Cheryl Rachele was fraudulent.

The court

ruled that James acted with the intent to place the property out of Penny's reach,
even though Penny initiated the sale and actually received the money that was due
to her upon execution of the lien on the property and even though James did not
assign the right of redemption with the intent to defraud Penny. Incredibly, the
trial court then went on to declare the assignment void, while simultaneously
allowing Penny to keep the money that Cheryl had paid to her upon exercising the
redemption.
*" The court did not understand the fact that Penny initiated the foreclosure
proceedings and the fact that she decided the amount to bid are both conditions
precedent to the right of redemption.
The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that James's assignment of the
right of redemption, as a matter of law, could not have placed the property beyond
Penny's reach. This is because Penny already owned the 48 East Property after
she bought it at the sheriffs sale that she initiated. Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 69(i)(7) Penny held "all right, title, interest, and claim of the judgment
debtor [James] in and to the property," subject to the right of redemption.
10

The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the Act) allows a creditor to reach
the assets of a debtor after those assets have been transferred by the debtor to a
third party, in order to satisfy the debt, if the transfer was fraudulent.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or
incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor....
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5. The Act was intended to prevent debtors from placing
their assets beyond the reach of creditors with valid claims against the debtor.
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987). It was not intended to
prevent a debtor from paying his debts. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 369 P.2d
962, 963-64 (Utah 1962) (holding that a creditor is not defrauded by a debtor's
payment to another creditor).
A quick review of the definition of a right of redemption clearly
demonstrates that the Act is inapplicable to the assignment of a right of
redemption. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j) allows a debtor, whose assets
have been sold at a sheriffs sale to satisfy a creditor's claims, to redeem his
property by paying the creditor an amount equal to the highest bid made at the
sheriffs sale of the property. The purpose of the right of redemption is "to give
the debtor an opportunity to pay his debt and salvage his property," and the law
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should not impede such an outcome. United States v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506, 508
(Utah 1976). Additionally, the debtor is allowed to transfer the right of
redemption. 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 1008 (1998). When a debtor's property is
redeemed, the creditor is still paid.
It is clear that the Act cannot apply to the assignment of the right of
redemption in the present case. Penny is not a creditor because she received the
money that was due to her upon execution of the lien and the judgment was
subsequently satisfied. The assignment of the right of redemption, as a matler of
law, could not have hindered Penny's ability to recover her judgment against this
property because she elected the amount to bid and accepted the redemption price.
A.

It was Error as a Matter of Law for the Trial Court to Rely upon
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to Declare James
Brockbank's Assignment of the Right of Redemption Void
Because Penny is Not a Creditor with a Claim.

Penny was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and thus, the trial
court should have denied Penny's motion for summary judgment because the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is inapplicable to James's assignment of the
right of redemption. The Act defines a creditor as "a person who has a claim," and
a claim as "a right to payment." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(3), (4). The creditor
can sue the debtor when the debtor transfers property to put it beyond the reach of

4

Although the trial court based its decision on the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act
(Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq.), common law principles of law, equity, and
fraud are applicable under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-11, which states, "Unless
displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including . . . fraud . . .
supplement this chapter's provisions."
12

the creditor, thereby hindering the creditor's ability to collect on its claim against
the debtor. Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(1 )(a). The assignment of a right of
redemption is simply not a transfer that can in any way hinder the creditor's ability
to collect on its claim. The creditor collects when the redemption price is paid.
The right of redemption is derived from the sale. The purpose of a right of
redemption is "to give the debtor an opportunity to pay his debt and salvage his
property." United States v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 1976). Thus, as long
as the creditor receives the payment that he is due, it should not matter that the
debtor is able to keep his property. Because the debt has been paid by the
redemptioner, the law should not void an assignment of the right of redemption as
a fraudulent transfer.
In the present case, Penny claims—and the trial court found—that James's
assignment of the right of redemption was fraudulent under the Act. The
argument and court holding is in error because of the following reasons. Penny set
the amount to be bid at the sheriffs sale and then accepted that bid amount from
Cheiyl as high bidder. Consequently, as defined by the act, Penny satisfied her
position as "creditor" and discharged her "claim" by setting and then accepting the
bid amount of the sheriffs sale.
1.

Penny is not a creditor with respect to the 48 East
Property because she purchased it at the sheriffs sale.

Penny's complaint seems to be that the property was redeemed, and
therefore, the assignment that allowed the redemption to take place must be
13

fraudulent. Such a complaint reveals a lack of understanding of the theories
underlying execution and redemption. After Penny credit bid $15,000 at the
sheriffs sale, she became the owner of the 48 East Property, subject to the right of
redemption. After the sale, James not only had the right to redeem his property by
paying the redemption price of $15,000 that Penny set with her credit bid at the
sheriffs sale of the 48 East Property, but he also had the right to transfer this right
of redemption. 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 1008(1998). Given these rights that the
law provides to James as a debtor, it is very clear that James's assignment of the
right of redemption to Cheryl cannot be fraudulent as to Penny, because Penny
was paid the money that she determined the 48 East Property to be worth through
her credit bid at the sheriffs sale.
2.

Penny only has claim to the $15,000 which she bid for the
48 East Property and for which Cheryl redeemed the
Property.

It would appear that Penny is crying fraud because she did not receive the
windfall that she expected when she bid only $15,000 for property which had been
earlier valued at about $45,000. Instead of making a $30,000 profit, Penny only
received $15,000. However, this is the risk that a creditor faces when it makes a
low bid at a sheriffs sale of the debtor's property. Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v.
Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Utah App. 1990). See also Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j)(3) ('The property may be redeemed within six
months after the sale by paying the amount of the purchase") (emphasis added).
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In Tech-Fluid, Tech-Fluid, the plaintiff creditor, was the sole bidder at a
sheriffs sale executing a $69,708 mechanics' lien on an oil well owned by the
debtor, Paiute. Id. at 1330. At the sale, Tech-Fluid only bid $4,000, a small
fraction of the amount it was owed. Paiute then assigned the right of redemption
to a third party, Wind River, who redeemed the property at the low price set by
Tech-Fluid. Tech-Fluid sued the debtor and Wind River claiming, inter alia, that
Wind River was required to pay the full lien amount before the property could be
redeemed. IdL at 1330-31. However, the court held that Wind River was entitled
to redeem the property at the price Tech-Fluid bid. Id at 1335. The court noted,
"As the only bidder at the sale, Tech-Fluid established the value of the well
for redemption purposes and placed itself in the predicament it now finds
itself. . . According to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(f)(3) [now Rule
69(j)(3)] Wind River was only obligated to pay what Tech Fluid [sic] paid
plus the specified interest."
Id. at 1335 (citations omitted).
Similarly, any disappointment that Penny suffered because of the
assignment of the right of redemption was created by her own actions. She placed
herself in the predicament in which she now finds herself. Penny, as the sole
bidder, credit bid $15,000 at the sheriffs sale of the 48 East Property, only a
fraction of both the property's value and the amount owed her pursuant to the
supplemental decree.5 Penny was trying to create a windfall by obtaining the

3

The amount of the judgment was paid, however. (Record at 860-861.) This was
pointed out to the trial court. (Record at 502.)
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property for a fraction of its value while keeping James indebted to her. In her
effort she found a cooperative friend in the court.
However, James assigned his right of redemption to Cheryl who redeemed
the property for the bid amount of $15,000. Like Tech-Fluid, Penny was caught in
her own game of trying to create a windfall. Upset, she cried fraud (despite
keeping the $15,000 Cheryl paid to redeem the property and thus forfeiting any
objection that she may have had). Penny set the redemption price at the sheriffs
sale, and therefore, she cannot now be heard to complain that the price paid by
Cheryl—a price that Penny chose—to redeem the property constitutes fraud.
B.

It was Error as a Matter of Law for the Trial Court to Hold that
the Assignment of the Right of Redemption was Fraudulent
when James Brockbank Did Not Intend to Hinder, Delay, or
Defraud Penny by Transferring the Right of Redemption to
Cheryl Rachele, and as a Matter of Law Could not Hinder,
Delay, or Defraud Penny.

The Act states that an allegedly defrauded creditor can recover against a
debtor when the debtor has acted "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
[the] creditor of the debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(l)(a). The Act at § 25-65(2) then lists several factors the court may consider to determine "actual intent."
These factors include whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had
been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
16

(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt
was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor
who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
Significantly, "a creditor who claims a debtor transferred property with actual
intent to defraud under section 25-6-5(1 )(a) must establish that claim by clear and
convincing evidence." Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah App.
1999). It is also important to remember that the purpose of a right of redemption
is to allow a debtor to both pay his debt and retain his property, and the law should
not inhibit such an outcome. Loosely, 551 P.2d at 508. By looking at what the
evidence of this case actually demonstrates, it is obvious that James did not
transfer the right of redemption with the actual intent to defraud Penny.
First, Cheiyl is not an insider. The only relevant definition that the Act
gives for "insider" is "a relative of the debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(7)(a).
The Act goes on to define a "relative" as "an individual related to a spouse, related
by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, or a
spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third
degree." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(11). While Cheryl did at one time maintain a
relationship with James as "boyfriend and girlfriend," this relationship does not fit
the definition of an insider according to the Act. Moreover, a transfer between

17

people maintaining a close relationship is not necessarily invalid and should not be
labeled fraudulent if the other facts surrounding the transfer establish its validity.
Givan v. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah 1960) (holding that a transfer to an
insider is not per se fraudulent, especially when there is a credible explanation for
the transfer).
Second, Cheryl has possession and control of the 48 East Property—James
does not. However, it is important to remember that James did not transfer the 48
East Property itself to Cheryl; he only assigned his right to redeem that property.6
Cheryl now owns the 48 East Property because she redeemed it by paying Penny
the $15,000 that Penny bid at the sheriffs sale of the property. Thus, the Act is
inapplicable because the "property" that James transferred to Cheiyl—the right of
redemption—did not impede Penny's ability to collect the money that James owed
her.7

6

While James did execute a warranty deed after the sheriffs sale purporting to
transfer the 48 East Property to Cheiyl, this deed was a nullity because Penny had
acquired "all right, title, interest, and claim" in the 48 East Property by purchasing
it at the sheriffs sale. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(i)(7). In any event, the
appellate court seemed to rely on the deed for supporting the trial court's ruling of
contempt and thirty day incarceration order of James.
7
Penny argues—and the trial court found—that because James stated that he
assigned the right of redemption to Cheryl to keep Penny from "trashing" the
apartments before he could get them back, and because one mortgage payment for
the 48 East Property was made from James's account, the assignment of the right
of redemption was fraudulent. Again, it is unclear how this transfer defrauded
Penny because she received the money due her based upon her own bid. Since the
purpose of a right of redemption is to allow a debtor to both pay his debts and to
keep his property, it is not fraudulent as a matter of law for James to make other
arrangements in respect to the property.
18

Third, James did not abscond, the assignment of the right of redemption
was not hidden, and the right of redemption was not substantially all of James's
assets. It is obvious that James could not have hidden the transfer of the right of
redemption because Penny received the redemption price from Cheryl. Penny
knew that the transfer had taken place. Moreover, subsequent to the redemption of
the 48 East Property, James satisfied the underlying judgment which was held by
Penny by selling other property that he owned—property that had not been
transferred, and thus, was still in his name.
Fourth, Cheryl did pay James consideration that was reasonably equivalent
in value to the right of redemption. Penny, in her argument, confused the right to
redeem the 48 East Property with the 48 East Property itself. The court also
confused the two. It is undisputed that Cheryl paid James $50 for the right of
redemption. Penny and the trial court forget or refuse to understand that the right
of redemption did not give Cheiyl the 48 East Property—it only gave her the
"right" to redeem that properly. Cheryl did not have to exercise that right.
Essentially, Cheryl purchased an option when she paid James $50 for the
assignment. Cheiyl still had to pay Penny $15,000 to actually gain possession and
ownership of the properly. This payment was required because subsequent to the
sheriffs sale Penny was the owner of the property subject only to the right of
redemption. Because Cheiyl had to pay the full price of the property (i.e. the price
that Penny had set through her bid at the sheriffs sale along with the statutory
surcharge and attorney's fees) in order to actually gain ownership of the property,
19

fifty dollars was certainly sufficient consideration to obtain right to redeem the
property.
Penny complains that the $15,000 which Cheryl paid for the 48 East
Property is only a fraction of the actual fair market value of the property. While it
is true that the property was valued at about $45,000, Penny's own act determined
the price for which the property could be redeemed. Penny established that price
by her bid of $15,000 at the sheriffs sale. A creditor who sets the redemption
price through the bid which he or she makes at the sheriffs sale cannot be heard to
complain when the property is redeemed at that price. The Supreme Court of Utah
held this to be true even if the price is only a fraction of the property's market
value or only a fraction of the amount owed by the debtor to the creditor. TechFluid Services, 787 P.2d at 1335; See also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j)(3)
OThe property may be redeemed within six months after the sale by paying the
amount of the purchase") (emphasis added). Penny set the value of the 48 East
Property for redemption purposes by bidding $15,000 at the sheriffs sale; she
cannot now complain about the amount required for redemption.
The above examination of the statutory "badges of fraud" reveals that
James did not assign the right of redemption to Cheryl with the actual intent to
defraud Penny. As long as a debtor pays his debts, it is not fraudulent for him to
show intent towards the disposition of his right of redemption. This is the purpose
of a right of redemption, Loosely, 551 P.2d at 508, and the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act was not intended to impede such an outcome, Ned J. Bowman, 369
20

P.2d at 963-64. It is easy to conclude that James did not act with the actual intent
o

to defraud Penny.
Rather than rely upon the statutory "badges" of actual intent, the trial court
apparently relied upon its previous ruling that James's assignment of the right of
redemption was in contravention of the court's restraining order, which prohibited
James from conveying or pledging any interest he had in real property. It would
seem the trial court was implying by this statement that, because James's
assignment of the right of redemption was allegedly in contravention of the
restraining order, it was also fraudulent. Ignoring the fact that this implication
lacks any validity in case law, James's transfer of the right of redemption did not
violate the court order because a right of redemption is not an interest in real
property.9 Lavton v. Thavne, 133 F.2d 287, 289 (10th Cir. 1943) ("[A right of
redemption] is a mere personal privilege rather than an interest or estate in land . .

Significantly, the trial court made findings contrary to this obvious conclusion
upon cross-motions for summary judgment. Ignoring the fact that "actual intent"
to commit fraud must be proved with clear and convincing evidence, Bradford,
993 P.2d at, 891, the trial court could only find that James acted with actual intent
to defraud Penny if there were no disputes about the facts that the trial court used
to make its finding, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). Obviously, there are
genuine issues of material fact concerning James's intent in assigning the right of
redemption, and thus, the trial court erred in granting Penny's Motion for
Summary Judgment. However, this court does not need to remand this proceeding
to the trial court for decisions on this issue; Section LA and Section II clearly
demonstrate that as a matter of law Penny's motion should have been denied,
Cheryl's motion should have been granted, and title quieted to Cheryl.
9
This issue has come before this court previously. Appellate No. 980113. In an
unpublished opinion, however, this court reached its decision on other grounds
and did not address the issue of whether or not James's assignment of the right of
redemption was a pledge or transfer of real property.
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it does not constitute any interest or estate in the real estate itself."). Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 69(i)(7) clearly indicates that the purchaser at a sheriffs sale
(Penny in this case) receives "all right, title, interest, and claim of the judgment
debtor [James] in and to the property." By assigning the right of redemption,
James did not transfer any interest in the 48 East Property since Penny obtained
"all interest" in the property through her purchase at the sheriffs sale. James only
assigned a "mere personal privilege." Id. at 289. Since James did not violate the
court order, the soundness of the trial court's implication dissolves, and it becomes
very obvious that the assignment of the right of redemption cannot be fraudulent.10
In summary, the trial court erred in applying the Act to the assignment of
the right of redemption. Penny received the redemption money to which she was
entitled and therefore cannot be a creditor with a claim. Moreover, the trial court
erred in finding that James assigned the right of redemption with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud Penny because, as the preceding section has shown, the
trial court's reliance upon certain "badges of fraud" was misplaced and the court's
inferences from some of James's other actions were unreasonable. The trial court
did not understand or refused to recognize that Penny initiated the sheriffs sale

The trial court took the point of view that James could not have the right of
redemption. Therefore, Penny, with the court's support, could abuse James as a
creditor by depriving him of his redemption right. Moreover, the court's
suggestion that Cheryl get her money from James is repugnant. It reflects a
hostility for the rule of law, favoritism towards Penny, and complete and total
disregard for Cheryl's rights.
22

and set the price at which the property was to be sold. The trial court should have
denied Penny's Motion for Summary Judgment.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED CHERYL
RACHELE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
PENNY WAIVED ANY OBJECTION SHE HAD TO THE
ASSIGNMENT BY ACCEPTING THE REDEMPTION PRICE PAID
The undisputed facts clearly indicate that Penny has waived any objection

she may have had to the assignment of the right of redemption by accepting and
retaining the redemption price paid by Cheryl. Simply stated, an allegedly
defrauded party cannot seek rescission of the allegedly fraudulent contract and
retain the benefit of the performance of the contract.11 The Utah Supreme Court
has explained that a party claiming fraud has two alternative causes of action that
he or she may elect in order to recover against another party committing an alleged
fraud. "The plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to elect to rescind the
transaction and recover the purchase price or to affirm the transaction and recover
damages." Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). "Any delay on the
part of the defrauded party, especially his remaining in possession of the property
received by him under the contract, and dealing with it as his own"" constitutes an
affirmation of the transaction and a waiver of the right to rescind the contract. Id.
(emphasis added) (citing Chester v. McDaniel 504 P.2d 726, 727-728 (Or. 1972)).

11

Because "[a]n assignment is a contract," and "is subject to the same requisites as
to validity as other contracts," 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 4, each of the following
cases apply to the present case, even though they may deal with a contract in
general and not specifically with an assignment.
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In Chester, it was further noted that u[t]hese remedies . . . are not concurrent but
wholly inconsistent. The adoption of one is the exclusion of the other." Id., at 727
(quoting Scott v. Walton, 52 P. 180, 181 (Or. 1898)). Thus, when a party elects to
retain the performance delivered by the party alleged to have committed the fraud,
his or her remedy is limited to the damages caused by the fraud—the defrauded
party cannot rescind the contract. Id Additionally, when a party claiming fraud
chooses to rescind the contract, instead of seeking damages, all parties, including
the party that allegedly committed the fraud, are put back into the position that
they were in immediately before the allegedly fraudulent action took place.
Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah App. 1988).
In the present case, it is undisputed that Penny retained the money Cheryl
paid when redeeming the 48 East Property. Indeed, Penny even credited her
judgment against James in the amount of the redemption price, $15,000 - which
was specifically identified in the May 10, 1999 order (Record at 860-861).
Despite the identification of this fact, the trial court granted Penny's Motion for
Summary Judgment, finding that "Third Party Plaintiff did not waive her right to
challenge Respondent's transfer of [the] 48 East [Property] to Third Party
Defendant." Findings of Fact ^ 37. This finding is more like a conclusion because
it contradicts the Utah law that is stated above. By retaining the redemption price
Cheryl paid, Penny waived any right she had to seek rescission of the assignment
of the redemption. See Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). Penny
has not sought damages for the allegedly fraudulent transfer of the right of
24

redemption.12 Also, to seek rescission is precluded since Penny has chosen to
keep the money that Cheryl paid when redeeming the 48 East Property.
Instead of declaring the transfer void and allowing Penny to retain the
money that she received as a result of the transfer, the court should have granted
Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed Penny's third party complaint,
and quieted title in the property to Cheryl. In ruling that the transfer was
fraudulent, it should have considered restoring the right of redemption to James,
returning the 48 East Property to Penny, and restoring the $15,000 redemption
price to Cheryl. However, this approach is not possible. The statutory time of
redemption is strictly construed and it has expired.14 Thus, to truly "undo" the

12

Not only has Penny not sought damages, she is not even entitled to recover any
damages that she may have suffered through the assignment of the right of
redemption. As discussed above in Section I.A., Penny cannot ciy fraud simply
because she did not receive the windfall that she expected by bidding only $15,000
for propeity that was previously valued at over $45,000. Penny set the redemption
price at the sheriffs sale by bidding $15,000, and she cannot now complain that
$15,000 is not fair market value for the 48 East Property. Tech-Fluid Services,
Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Utah App. 1990); See also
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j)(3) ("The property may be redeemed within six
months after the sale by paying the amount of the purchase") (emphasis added).
13
Essentially, Penny wanted the propeity transferred back to James. The court
accommodated her desire by ignoring the fact that Penny instigated the sheriffs
sale, set the bid price, accepted the bid amount, and credited the bid amount
towards James's debt. The essence of Cheryl's claim is that the court does not
have jurisdiction to set aside an execution sale where the redemption price has
been paid to and accepted by the creditor, the creditor's judgment has been
satisfied, and the redemption period has passed.
"It is clear that the right of a purchaser at a sheriffs sale either to receive the
proper redemption amount in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(f)
[now 69(j)] or to have the title perfected at the end of the six-month period is a
substantive right. Accordingly, strict compliance with the six-month redemption
25

assignment and return the parties to the status quo, the court would have to void
Penny's crediting James's debt $15,000, order Penny to return $16,653 to Cheryl,
void the sheriffs sale, return to James the right of redemption, and order James to
return to Cheryl her payment for the redemption right.
The trial court attempts to remedy its clearly erroneous application of the
law by stating that if Cheryl wants a refund of the money that she paid to Penny,
she must sue James. It is unclear how Cheryl has a cause of action against James
when Penny is the individual that was paid the redemption price and retains the
benefit of the redemption.
The trial court's ruling was contrary to law of redemption even though the
law of redemption was clearly explained to the court. The case of Tech-Fluid
Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc.. 787 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Utah App. 1990)
deals with the issue presented here. The trial court completely ignored Cheryl's
rights when it suggests that she sue James to get the money paid to Penny for the
redemption. Only this court can remedy the total disregard of Cheryl's rights.
CONCLUSION
Cheryl Rachele respectfully requests this court to reverse the trial court's
finding that James's assignment of the right of redemption was fraudulent, to grant
Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment, to dismiss Penny's third party
complaint, and to quiet title to the 48 East Property in Cheryl Rachele. The

period is normally required." Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1991)
(footnotes omitted).
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Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act does not apply to the present case because Penny
was paid the redemption money determined by her own sale and because James, as
a matter of law, could not have intended to hinder, delay, or defraud Penny. Also,
Penny, as a matter of law, cannot be a creditor within the meaning of the Act. If
she deemed to be a creditor, the right of redemption is meaningless. James did not
assign the right of redemption to hinder Penny's ability to recover on her judgment
against James. Moreover, the trial court erred by rescinding the assignment of the
right of redemption, allowing Penny to keep the redemption money, and directing
Cheiyl to James for recovery of her money.
Dated t h i s < ^ d a y of September, 2000.
Respectfully Submitted,

?^v
BRENT D. YOUNG, Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
A.

Utah Code Annotated 25-6-2. Definitions.

B.

Brockbank v. Brockbank, Memorandum Decision Case No. 990547-CA,
filed June 2, 2000

C.

Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah
App. 1990)

D.

United States v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976)

E.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c)

F.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j)

G.

Order Concerning Cross Motions for Summary Judgment by Third Party
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant

H.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concerning Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment by Third Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant

I.

Third Party Plaintiffs Objection to Third Party Defendant's Motion for
Summaiy Judgment

J.

Affidavit of Cheryl Rachele in Support of Third Party Defendant's CrossMotion for Summaiy Judgment; and in Opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment

K.

Combined Memorandum in Support of Third Party Defendant's CrossMotion

L.

Third Party Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Third Party Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Third Party Defendant

M.

Third Party Plaintiffs Affidavit Concerning Third Party Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment

M.

Utah Court Of Appeals Memorandum Decision Dated 2 June 2000
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A.

Utah Code Annotated 25-6-2. Definitions.

A

l"^4h-l. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim

(7) "Insider" includes:
(a) if the debtor is an individual:
(i) a relative of the debtor or ol'n yeneial paunei .it'lhc dc*bi<u

(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a spouse, related by
consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, or a spouse, and
includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.

II, I M || nl , Brockbank, Memorandum Decision
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The t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d an o r d e r which " r e s t r a i n e d and
e n j o i n e d [ a p p e l l a n t ] from, t a k i n g any a c t i o n t o convey o r p l e d g e
any of t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y a w a r d e d h i en by t h e Supplemental D e c r e e . "
A p p e l l a n t s u b s e q u e n t l y c o n v e y e d a r i g h t of redemption and
c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s l y e x e c u t e d a w a r r a n t y de-ad conveying h i s
remaining i n t e r e s t in the p r o p e r t y .
A p p e l l a n t argues t h e
c o n v e y a n c e of h i s r i g h t of r e d e m p t i o n d i d n o t v i o l a t e t h e c o u r t
o r d e r b e c a u s e a r i g h t of r e d e m p t i o n i s n o t an i n t e r e s t i n
p r o p e r t y subject to the o r d e r .
As d i s c u s s e d i n Knickerbocker . .
Cannon, 912 P. 2d 95 3 (Utah 1996) , t h e p u r p o s e of t h e t r i a l
c o u r t ' s o r d e r was " t o p r e v e n t t h e p a r t i e s from removing t h e
m a r i t a l a s s e t s from t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e [ t r i a l ] c o u r t . "
Id.
a t 9 7 5 . A p p e l l a n t ' s u s e of a w a r r a n t y deed t o convey an i n t e r e s t
m p r o p e r t y i s e v i d e n c e d by t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e deed:
"JAMES L.
5R0CK3ANX, g r a n t o r of P r i c e , County of Carbon, hereby conveys and
warrants t o " . .
" Cf. S t u c k i v . E l l i s , 114 Utah 43S, 201 P . 2 d
43S, 490 (1949) ( s t a t i n g b e s t method t o convey p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t
i s by deed) ; see a l s o U t a h Code Ann., § 57-1-12 (1994) ( g o v e r n i n g
form cf w a r r a n t y d e e d :
"Conveyances cf l a n d may be s u b s t a n t i a l l y
i n t h e f o l l o w i n g form . . . "} . Thus, t h e t r i a l c o u r t was
j u s t i f i e d i n f i n d i n g a p p e l l a n t i n contempt f o r v i o l a t i n g i t s
o r d e r p r o h i b i t i n g him from c o n v e y i n g h i s r e a l p r o p e r t y , and we

need not determine whether appellant also violated the order by
conveying his right cf redemption.
Appellant next argues the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering him to serve sixty days in jail1 or obtain a
reconveyance of the property from the third party grantee in
order to purge the contempt finding. In other wcrds, appellant
could choose no either serve time in jail, or he could purge the
contempt finding by obtaining the property back from the third
party to whom he conveyed it--thus restoring the status quo.
Appellant chose to serve thirty days in jail,2 and thus he is no
longer subject to the court's second alternative that he obtain a
reconveyance in order tc purge the contempt. Because the trial
courtls contempt order has been satisfied, the trial court cannot
impose any further penalties for that contempt and cannot mandate
that the parties take any further action. Therefore, this court
can provide no relief affecting the rights of the parties, and
the issue is moot. See Winters v. Schuiman, 1999 UT App 119,1|ll,
977 P.2d 1213, cert, denied, 994 P. 2d 1271 (Utah 1999)**.
Finally, appellee cross-appeals the trial court's award of
attorney fees, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to award her the entire amount cf her requested fees.
In her brief, appellee cites no authority supporting her
position. We "'decline to consider an argument that a party has
failed to adequately brief. f " State v. Thomas, 1999 UT App
2,^11, 974 P.2"d 269 (citation omitted).

1. Under section 78-32-10, "the court may impose a fine not
exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in the county
jail not exceeding 30 days, or both.'1 Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10
(1996). The parties dispute whether the court had authority to
impose a longer sentence because it found appellant in contempt
on multiple grounds.
2. At oral argument, counsel stated that the trial court reduced
the sixty day sentence to thirty days, and that appellant had
served thirty days in jail.
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TECH-FLUID SERVICE?., IM ,
Plaintiff and VppelianL
i \\\\

W OPERATING. IN< , Paiute
i hi & Mining Corp., H al..
Defendants and Respondents
No. 890067-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb 16 1990

Assignee of bankrupt debtor's right of
redemption in oil well against which me-
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chanics' lien had been filed exercised its 4. Mechanics' Liens <s=3299
redemption right. Holder of mechanics'
Substantial compliance with procedural
lien challenged the redemption. The Sev- requirements of redemption rule is suffienth District Court, Duchesne County, cient. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 6915H2V
Dennis L. Draney, J., held that the redemp- 5. Mechanics' Liens @»299
tion was valid. Holder appealed. The
Where assignee of redemption right
Court of Appeals, Orme. J., held that: (1) substantially complied with procedural rethe bankruptcy trustee abandoned her quirements of redemption rule after foreright of redemption when she abandoned closure of mechanics' lien, and foreclosure
the well; (2) assignee properly redeemed sale purchaser failed to demonstrate any
the well: and (3) holder could not execute prejudice from assignee's failure to strictly
on the redemption right.
adhere to requirements of that rule, redemption was valid. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
Affirmed.
69(fH2).
6. Clerks of Courts <s=>67
1. Bankruptcy <5=s3135
Mechanics* Liens <s=3307
Upon foreclosure of mechanics' lien, if
Bankruptcy trustee was not required
to explicitly abandon her right of redemp- proceeds from foreclosure sale are inadetion in foreclosed property for it to revert quate to pay entire amount determined in
to debtor and, thus, when court ordered foreclosure judgment, clerk must, as mere
trustee to abandon her interest in well, ministerial duty, enter deficiency judgment
right of redemption reverted to debtor: against debtor, however, without initial
therefore, debtor's assignment of that foreclosure judgment, clerk cannot enter
right was valid. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule deficiency judgment and absent such judgment he or she cannot properly issue writ
69(f), (f)(1), (f){'2){2).
of execution. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 69(a-e).
2. Mechanics' Liens <3=J299
7. Mines and Minerals <3=»lIT
Right to redeem property sold upon
Holder of mechanics' lien was not entiforeclosure of mechanics' lien is such that tled to execute upon assignee's redemption
it can be only exercised after property has right; holder failed to first obtain forebeen sold at foreclosure sale, and only closure judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
those with interest in property at time oi 69(a-e).
sale (or their successors in interest) have
S. Mines and Minerals 3=117
right to redeem. Rules Civ.Proc Rule
Where holder of mechanics' lien on oil
69(f)(1).
well purchased that well at foreclosure sale
for $4,000, assignee of right of redemption
3. Mechanics' Liens 3=299
was only required to pay $4,000 plus 67<>
In evaluating necessity for strict cominterest to redeem property; assignee was
pliance with redemption statutes after forenot required to pay entire amount of alclosure of mechanics' lien, court focuses
leged debt. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 69(f)(3).
upon nature of statutory requirements and
likelihood of prejudice; if failure to adhere
Harry H. Souvall and Robert M. McRae,
to requirements will affect substantive
right of one of parties and possibly preju- Vernal, for plaintiff and appellant.
dice that party, courts require strict compliClark B. Allred and Gayle F. McKeachance, but, if requirements are merely pro- nie. Vernal, for defendants and responcedural and will not prejudice one of par- dents.
ties, substantial compliance is sufficient.
Before JACKSON, and ORME. JJ..
Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 69(f)(2).

TST PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

L;;:I>
and BULLOCK,

lor District Judge.

ORME. Judge:
Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. appeals from an adverse ruling concerning
the redemption of property it purchased at
a sheriffs sale. We affirm.

In the fall of 19ST. Tech-Fluid discovered
that Paiute intended to assign its redemption right. Tech-Fluid demanded a quitclaim deed, but Paiute refused. On December 14, 1987, Tech-Fluid obtained from the
county clerk a writ of execution instructing
the sheriff to execute on Paiute's redemption right. A public sale of the redemption
right was set for January 5, 1988.

FACTd

On December 31. 1987, Paiute assigned
its redemption right to Wind River Resources Corporation. On January 1, 1988,
the final day of the redemption period,
Wind River exercised the right of redemption by delivering to the sheriffs office of
Duchesne County 1^ an inadequately notarized copy of the assignment of Paiute's
right of redemption; 2) an acknowledged
notice of redemption setting forth the calculation of the redemption amount, the
property to be redeemed, and the basis for
its right to redeem; and 3) a cashier's
In December 1985, Paiute filed a volun- check in the amount of $4,310. The sheriff
tary reorganization petition under chapter issued a sheriffs redemption certificate to
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee was Wind River.
subsequently appointed.
In February
On January 5 and 6. Tech-Fluid attempt1986. the state district court entered a ed to proceed with the scheduled execution
judgment of foreclosure as against all of sale and purchase the redemption right.
the defendants in the lien action except However, the sheriff would not accept
Paiute. Because of the pending bankruptTech-Fluid's bid until the district court decy, the district court specifically declined to
termined whether a redemption ngni eouid
adjudicate the claim as between Paiute and
be subject to execution.
Tech-Fluid.
On January 8. Tech-Fluid obtained an
In May 198T, Tech-Fluid obtained an ororder
directing the sheriff to show cause
der lifting the automatic stay as it applied
why
he
should not issue his deed to Techto the lien action and ordering the trustee
Fluid
because
of an invalid redemption by
" to abandon her interest in the well. ThereWind
River.
The
district court subsequentafter. Tech-Fluid obtained an order from
ly
held
a
hearing
on the order to show
the district court directing the sale of Paiute's interest in the well. No judgment of cause and ruled that 1) the assignment was
foreclosure against Paiute was ever en- valid, 2) the right of redemption could not
tered or docketed prior to the court-ordered be executed upon, 3) Wind River was entisale, a procedure which, while unorthodox, tled to redemption because it substantially
was never objected to by any party. A complied with the statutory requirements
sheriffs sale of the well was held on July for redemption, and 4) Tech-Fluid had no
2, 1987. Tech-Fluid was the only bidder at further interest in the well. Tech-Fluid
the sale and purchased the property with a filed a further motion, claiming that Wind
River was required to pay not only the
84,000 credit bid.

Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation, the
predecessor of respondent Gavilan Operating, Inc., had an ownership interest in an
oil and gas well located in Duchesne County. Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc.
supplied services and materials to the well
for which it was not paid. In November
1984, it filed a mechanics' lien on the well
claiming that $69,708 was owing. In January 1985. Tech-Fluid commenced an action
to foreclose its lien naming Paiute and several other entities as defendants.

1. J Robert Bullock. Senior District Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 7S-3-2-H10) (1989).
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$4,000 but the entire amount of the lien.
The motion was denied and the court
signed its conclusions of law and order.
Tech-Fluid brought this appeal.

doned any right to redeem which might
arise in the event of foreclosure. The trial
court heard arguments from counsel at the
order to show cause hearing. Subsequent
to the hearing, the parties suomitted memoranda to support their positions. The
court ruled that the trustee had abandoned
the well long before the redemption right
arose. The evidence and the law support
the district court's conclusion and therefore
we affirm.

On appeal Tech-Fluid raises several arguments. First, it argues that, although
the trustee abandoned the well, she did not
abandon the right to redeem the well in the
event of foreclosure. If this were true, the
assignment from Paiute to Wind River
would be invalid because Paiute would
have had no interest in the redemption
[1] Tech-Fluid concedes that a right of
right, which would have been held, until its
redemption
is a property interest.3 Moreexpiration, by the trustee. Second, TechFluid argues that the court erred in holding over, it is clear that upon the riling of the
that it could not execute on the redemption bankruptcy proceeding, the entire ''bundle
right. Third, it argues that the redemption of rights" Paiute had in the well, including
was unsuccessful because Wind River its right to redeem in the event of any sale
failed to strictly comply with the redemp- subject to Utah R.Civ.P. 69, see note 3,
became part of the bankruptcy estion statute. Finally, Tech-Fluid argues supra,
4
tate.
However,
we do not agree that the
that Wind River was required to pay the
trustee
had
to
explicitly
abandon her right
entire amount of the lien before it could
of
redemption
for
it
to
revert
to the debtredeem the property.
or.5 any more than she had to explicitly
abandon other rights of ownership, such as
ABANDONMENT OF THE RIGHT OF
the right to collect royalties or the right to
REDEMPTION
explore and develop or even the right of
possession.
Tech-Fluid argues that the trustee never
:
According to the bankruptcy code, ''the
abandoned her r.ght to redeem the well
and therefore Paiute had no right which it court may order the trustee to abandon any
couid assign to Wind River. On the other property of the estate that is burdensome
hand. Gavilan. as successor to Paiute. ar- to the estate or that is of inconsequential
gues that when the trustee abandoned her value and benefit to the estate." II U.S.C.
interest in the weil. she necessar.lv aban- § 554(b) (1989). Courts and commentators
, It is notewor:h\ :nat the trustee ne\er claimed
she had somehow retained the right to redeem
Paiute b interest .n the weil. On the contrary,
we are presented with her affidavit stating she
always considered the redemption ngnt abandoned right alone with the weil. However, that
affidavit was not submitted to the tnai court, is
introduced tor the first time on appeal, and.
therefore, is not part of the record properly
before u*. Accordingly, it plays no part in our
decision.
3.

A right of redemption is created m Utah by
Rule 6<H0 of the Utah Rules oi Civil Procedure
which provides, m pertinent part, that "(property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold
separately, may be redeemed by the following
persons or their successors in interest: (I) the
judgment debtor
" Utah R.Civ.P 69(0(1).
"Successors in interest" clearlv include assignees. See Utah R.Civ.P. o9(0(:H:).

4.

When a debtor files for bankruptcy, an estate
ib created which includes "ail .egal or equitable
interests of the deotor in property as of the
commencement of the case." II U.S.C. § 541
(1979). According to Collier. "(a]n equity of
redemption comes within the scope of 'all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property.' " 4 W. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy
r
'541.07ft 1 (15th ed. 1989) (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 (1979)) See aLo Layton v. Layton. 105
Utah I. UO P2d 759, 761 (1*43)

5. Tech-Fluid relies upon § 554(d) of the bankruptcy code which states that property oi the
estate that is not abandoned
and that is not
administered
remains property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) (19S9).

>2 Utah
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e recognized that once abandoned, "the
perty stands as if no bankruptcy had
m filed and the debtor enjoys the same
im to it and interest in it as he held
svious to the filing of bankruptcy." In
Cmseturner. S B.R. 581, 591 (D. Utah
81) (emphasis added). "Thus, abandone e constitutes a divestfiturej of all in'rests in property that were property of
le estate." 4 W. Collier, Collier on Bankuptcy 1 554.02[2] (15th ed. 1989) (emphasis
,dded).

us, the Fourth Circuit has at least stated in
dicta that when the trustee abandons her
interest in property of the estate. "the
property and the right of redemption remains in. or reverts to. the bankrupt." In
re Webb. 54 F.2d 1065, 1067 (4th Cir.1932).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
the redemption right belonged to Paiute
after the well was abandoned, and that
Paiute could properly assign that right to
Wind River.

[2] The trial court's conclusion in this
COMPLIANCE WITH
:ase is consistent with Cruseiurner and
REDEMPTION STATUTE
Collier. We see no reason why the right to
The district court concluded that Wind
redeem should be treated differently than
River had only to comply substantially,
any other property interest that the trustee
rather than strictly, with the requirements
has in the property prior to abandonment.
oi Rule 69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
On the contrary, it would be anomalous to
Procedure. The court also concluded that
view the right of redemption as an indepenWind River had substantially complied with
dent property interest which stayed with
those requirements. We agree on both
the trustee when she abandoned the propscores.
erty to which it pertained. The right to
Rule 69(f)(2) provides that, at the time of
redeem is such that it can only be exercised
after property has been sold at a fore- redemption.
closure sale, and only those with an interthe redemptioner must produce to the
est in the property at the time of the sale
officer or person from whom he seeks to
(or their successors in interest) have a right
redeem, and serve with his notice to the
to redeem. See Utah R.Civ.P. 69(f)(1). See
officer: (1) a certified copy of the docket
also Layton v. Thayne. 133 F.2d 2S7, 2S9
of the judgment under which he claims
the right to redeem, or. if he redeems
(10th Cir.1943), cert, denied, 323 U.S. 786,
upon a mortgage or other lien, a memo65 S.Ct. 277. 89 L.Ed. 627 (1944). It is
randum of the record thereof certified by
inconsistent to suggest that a trustee, havthe recorder; (2) an assignment, properly
ing abandoned property and consequently
acknowledged or proved where the same
being divested of all interest therein, would
is necessary to establish his claim; (3) an
still retain a right to redeem, at least abaffidavit by himself or his agent showing
sent some expressed and unambiguous inthe amount then actually due on the lien.
tent by the trustee to retain that right.6
We hold, therefore, that "divestiture of all Utah R.Civ.P. 69(f)(2).
interests in the property" includes divestiTech-Fluid argues that the trial court
ture of the trustee's right to redeem.
erred when it applied a substantial compliTech-Fluid points to no compelling authority inconsistent with the trial court's
and our conclusion. On the other hand,
although our attention has been drawn to
no case deciding the precise issue before
6.

We need not decide whether the trustee could
have specifically retained the right to redeem
the property even while abandoning the property. The trustee in this case chose not to attempt

ance test to determine whether Wind River
had properly redeemed. Tech-Fluid cites
Mollerup v. Storage Sys. Int'i 569 P.2d
1122 (Utah 1977), and argues that strict
compliance with the statutory requirements
to retain that right, see note 2, supra, and in the
absence of any indication to that effect, the
right to redeem automatically passed to Paiute
upon abandonment of the well.
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was necessary In Mollerup, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]he nght of
redemption has long been recognized as a
SUDS tan tive ngnt to be exercised in strict
accord aritn statutory terms " Id at 1124.

which confer a statutory nght
and
some of wtuch establish a procedure by
which that nght is perfected
'A statute is remedial wnen it relates to practice,
procedure, or remedies and does not affect
a suDStantive or vested right' ' 713 ? 2d
at 732 (quoting Mzeoack v Colasurdo. 102
Wasn 2d TO 685 P 2d 1074, 1081 (1984)).
The Gesa court went on to hold that the
technical failure involved m that case was
harmless because the failure did not affect
a suDStantive nght and appellant was not
prejudiced Id. at 732-33 See also Household Fin Corp v Bacon, 58 Or App 267,
648 P 2d 421, 423 (1982) (technical inconsistencies with statutory requirements did not
adversely affect nghts of purchaser)

Gavilan, on the other hand, argues that
substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) was sufficient under
United Scates v Loosley, 551 P 2d 506
(Utah 1976) In Loosley, tne Court stated
that
statutes dealing with redemption are regarded as remedial in character and
snouid be given liberal construction and
application to permit a property owner
wno can pay his deots to do so, and thus
maKe his creditor whole, and save his
property Therefore, if a deotor, acting
Our Supreme Court m Mollerup was
m good faitn. has suostantxally comconstruing Rule 69(f)(3) which sets a time
plied with the procedural
requirements
limit of six months in which redemption
of the rule m such a manner that the
must be made This provision clearly aflender mortgagee is not injured or adfects a substantive right of the purer aser.
versely arfectea, and 's getting what he
All right, title and interest m the proDerty
is entitled to the law will not aid in
do not vest in the purchaser at a foredepriMng the mortgagor of ms property
closure sale antil the redemption period has
for mere faihng short of exact compliexpired Local Realty Co v Linaquist, 96
ance with technicalities
Utan 29- 85 P 2d 770, ~72 (1938)
[T]he
la at 508 ^emphasis aaaed)
interest of the purcnaser is [mere ^ ] an
[3] Mollerca
and Loobieu
though equitable interest, suoject to be io»t or
seemmgK inconsistent are >*eadilv recon- canceUed or taken awav ov the deotor or
cued Very simolv not all ^edemotion pro- anv redemotioner or their assigns upon
vsions are a \e Courts n evaluating the pavment or the sale prce with interest.'
necessity tor atrct comoharce in these ^5 P 2a at ~~2 It the**e is no redemption
kmds or cases focus upon the nature of within the prescribed perod. the ourcnaser
the statutor requirements ana the likeli- is then entitled to a conveyance or the
hood or prejudice If fauure to adhere to property Utah R Civ P 69(f)(5^ To allow
the requirements* will arfect a substantive redemption oeyond the sivmonth pe-'od inngnt of one or the parties and possibly evitably compromises and prejudices the
Consequent^ the
prejudice that part\ then courts require purchaser a interest
strict compliance On the other hand, if Court concluded that absent some s gmfithe requirements are merelv procedural cant tacts to 'move the conscience of the
Court it would not extend the redemption
and will not prejudice one of the parties
suostantial compliance is sufficient
oenod Mollerup 5b9 P 2d at 1124
The Washington Supreme Court addressed these distinctions directlv in Gesa
Fed Credit Union i M dual Lire Ins Co
105 Wash 2d 248 713 P 2d 723 731-33
(1986) (en banc) The Gesa court recog
mzed that the Wasnmgton redemption stat
ute evolved a number oi provisions, some

Loobley like the case before us involved
Rule 69(f)(2) A brief recitation of the
facts m Loosley is helpful The Loosleys
failed to pay a government loan The
government then toreclosed on a property
interest of the Loosle\s At a foreclosure
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sale, the Griffiths purchased the property
interest. The Loosieys then assigned their
right of redemption to the Hammons who
further assigned the right to Basic Investment. Inc. One day prior to the six-month
redemption period, Basic served a notice of
redemption on the Griffiths' attorney, accompanied with a check for the correct
redemption amount. They did not serve
any of the documents specified m Rule
69(f)(2). Eight days after the tender, the
Griffiths returned the check and rejected
the tender based upon Basic's failure to
comply with Rule 69(f)(2).

River could surely nave aone more to comply with the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2)/
it complied more fully than did the defendants in Loosley. Additionally, as in Loosley, Tech-Fluid did not challenge the validity of the tender until several days after the
tender and after the redemption period had
run

The requirements at issue in this case
are identical to those in Loosley. They are
procedural in nature and do not affect any
substantive rights of the purchaser.*
Tech-Fluid has failed to demonstrate any
prejudice from the failure to strictly adhere
to the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2). ConThe trial court m Loosley concluded that sequently, we affirm the district court's
because Basic had failed to adhere to the re- holding that Wind River substantially comquirements of Rule 69(f)(2), their redemp- plied with the redemption provisions and
tion failed. On appeal, the Utah Supreme that such compliance is all that is necesCourt reversed. It recognized than the fail- sary.
ure to comply with the technical requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) had no adverse effects on the Griffiths. 551 P.2d at 508. It EXECUTION ... riEDEMPTION RIGHT
then held that since the assignment, were
Having concluded that Wind River otherproper. Basic had tendered the correct
wise properly redeemed, we now address
amount within the prescribed time, and the
whether Tech-Fluid could execute upon
Griffiths had failed to object, the redempPaiute's redemption right. We hold that it
tion was good. Id.
could not.
[4.5] Based upon the authority discussed above, and in particular Loosley, we
affirm that substantial compliance is the
proper test under Rule 69(f)(2). Moreover,
because the Court found substantial compliance in Loosley, we are obliged to find it
in this case. Tech-Fluid's position is even
weaker than the Griffiths' position was in
Loosley. Wind River not only tendered the
correct amount within the redemption period but also tendered some proof of the
assignment between Paiute and Wind River
and a document entitled "Notice of Redemption" giving additional facts about its
entitlement to redeem. Although Wind
7

W md River could have complied more fully m
several respects. Although there was no judgment docketed. Wind River could have submitted a copy of the court order directing sale
of the well. Moreover, there are no facts in the
record to suggest an excuse for the inadequate
notarization of the assignment. Finally, Wind
River could surely have submitted an affidavit
stating the alleged amount due on the hen

Wre need not address the more general
issue of whether a judgment creditor could
ever execute upon the judgment debtor's
right of redemption because Tech-Fluid
failed to obtain a foreclosure judgment
upon which a post-foreclosure sale deficiency judgment could be based and absent
such judgment, there was nothing on which
any execution could be premised. When
Tech-Fluid received relief from the automatic stay regarding the well, tt immediately proceeded to obtain an order from the
district court to sell Paiute's interest in the
well. In its haste, Tech-Fluid did not first
obtain a foreclosure judgment determining
the correcf amount owing
8. The procedural rules of 69(fX2) were likely
created for the benefit and protection of the
sheriff, so that he may be guided in what to
require to make certain that redemption is in
order. See. e.£.. Household Fin. Corp. v. Bacon,
58 Or.App. 267, 548 P.2d 421, 423 (1982).
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[6] Under a normal foreclosure scenario,9 the judgment: creditor first obtains a
foreclosure judgment determining the correct amount due and owning. Then, properr/ subject to the judgment is sold at a
foreclosure sale. See Utah R.Civ.P. 69(a)(e). If the proceeds from the sale are inadequate to pay the entire amount determined in the foreclosure judgment, "[t]he
clerk must, as a mere ministerial duty,
enter a deficiency judgment against the
[debtor]." First Nat'l Bank v. HaymoncL
39 Utah 151. 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (1936).
Without an initial foreclosure judgment,
the clerk has no basis upon which to calculate a deficiency. Thus, the clerk cannot
enter a deficiency judgment and absent
such a judgment he or she cannot properly
issue a writ of execution. Consequently,
the clerk in this case improperly issued the
writ of execution.

purchase was made, the amount of such
lien, with interest.
Utah R.Civ.P. 69(f)(3) (emphasis added).
Tech-Fluid does not claim to have had any
lien on the well other than the one which
permitted the original foreclosure sale.
Under the express language of the statute,
therefore, it was only entitled to the
amount of the purchase bid plus six percent interest. See Madsen, Equitable Considerations of Mortgage Foreclosure and
Redemption in Utah: A Need for Remedial Legislation, 1976 Utah L.Rev. 327. 34344.

Once again, Tech-Fluid is bound by its
choices, including the decision to bid only
34.000 on the well. As the only bidder at
the sale, Tech-Fluid established the value
of the well for redemption purposes and
placed itself in the predicament it now
finds itself. See Knes v. Allen Carpet,
[7] Tech-Fluid should not now be heard Inc.. 146 Ariz. 348, 706 P.2d 360, 363-64
to complain. It chose its own course of (1985) (en banc); Johnson v. Zahn. 380 111.
action by failing to first obtain a fore- 320. 44 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1942). According to
closure judgment. We hold that Tech- Ruie 69(f)(3), Wind River was only obligatFlmd was not entitled to execute upon Pai- ed to pay what Tech Fluid paid plus the
specified interest.
ute s redemption ngntz
AMOUNT OF REDEMPTION
[8] Finally, Tech-Fluid argues that
Wind River was obligated to pay not only
the amount of the bid but the entire
amount of the alleged debt. Ruie 69(f)(3)
provides in pertinent part:
The property may be redeemed from the
purchaser . . on paying the amount of
his purchase with 6 percent thereon in
addition . . and. if the purchaser is also
a creditor having a Hen prior to that of
the person seeking redemption, other
than the judgment under which said
9. The mechanics' lien statute specifically provides that mechanics' liens are foreclosed in the
same manner, and subject to the *ame right or
redemDtion. as in the case of mortgages. Std
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 (1988).
10. Having based our conclusion on Tech-Fluid's
failure to obtain a foreclosure judgment, we do
not mean to suggest that Tech-Fluid would have
prevailed had thib fact been otherwise. There is
apparently little ca*e law addressing the issue of

CONCLUSION
We affirm the rulings of the district
court and hold that: I) The trustee abandoned her right of redemption when she
abandoned the well; 2} Wind River substantially complied with the technical requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) and therefore
properly redeemed; 3) having failed to obtain a foreclosure judgment, Tech-Fluid
could not execute on the redemption right;
and 4) Wind River was only obligated under Rule 69(f)(3) to tender the amount of
the purchase plus interest.
whether a mortgage creditor may execute on the
redemption right of the mortgage debtor. However. Gavilun directs our attention to Johnson v.
Zahn, 380 III. 320. 44 N.E.2d 15 (1942). In
Johnson, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
lien did not attach to the judgment debtor's
equity of redemption arising from the judgment
creditor's deficiency judgment. 44 N.E.2d at 19.

1 3 3 6
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JACKSON, J., and J. ROBERT
BULLOCK, Senior District Judge,
concur.
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UNITED STATES of America. Plaintiff,
v
George B LOOSLEY, dba Farmers Supply
Company et al Defendants and
Appellants,
v

Sterling GRIFFITHS and Donna Griffiths.
his wife. Purchasers at Sheriff's
Sale and Respondents.
No. 14247
Supreme Court of Utah
June 13 1076
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Where assignees of mortgagors tendered correct amount due for redemption
of property to attorney for purchasers at
sheriff's sale one day before redemption
period expired and purchasers did not indicate any ground whatsoever for rejecting
tender, purchasers waived objections that
check was delivered to wrong person and
should have been delivered to purchasers
or to sheriff, that certified copy of docket
of judgment or memorandum of record
was not presented with check and that no
affidavit was presented showing amount
actually due on lien. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 69(f)(2).

fiths asked Mr. Park if they had to accept
the money or if there was any ground for
rejecting it. Mr. Park stated, in substance,
that he would look into the matter. Eight
days later, on June 20, 1975, Mr. Park returned the check to Basic Investment with
a letter which included:
Enclosed herewith please find a check
for $10,706 made out to Sterling Griffiths with the purchaser listed as Basic
Investment Corporation.

Lauren N. Beasley, of Cotro-Manes,
Warr, Fankhauser & Beasley, Salt Lake
City, for defendants-appellants.
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for respondents.
CROCKETT, Justice:
The United States (Small Business Administration") brought a foreclosure action
on a service station at Cedar City after the
lessors, George and Theodean Loosley,
failed to repay a Small Business Administration loan.
Defendants Sterling and Donna Griffiths bid in and purchased the mortgagee's
interest m the property at the sheriff's sale
held on December 13, 1974. Subsequently,
the Loosleys had assigned their interest to
the defendants, Marion and Gladys H a m mon, and the Hammons thereafter assigned
their rights of redemption to defendant,
Basic Investment, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as defendants). The latter appeals from a ruling of the district court
that its attempt to redeem was invalid.
On June 12, 1975, one day prior to expiration of the six-month redemption period,
defendant served a notice of redemption on
Michael Park, attorney for the Griffiths,
together with a check for $10,706, the correct amount needed to redeem the property.
In response to a telephone call, the Grif-

My clients have requested that I return that check to you for the reason
that a certified copy of the docket of
Judgment or a memorandum of record
was not presented with the check, nor
was an affidavit presented showing the
amount actually due on the lien.
Also, my client claims that the check
was delivered to the wrong person and
should have been delivered to himself or
the Sheriff.
The claimed deficiencies referred to in
the letter are based upon Rule 69(f)(2),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Redemption—How Made. At the time
of redemption the person seeking the
same may make payment of the amount
required to the person from whom the
property is being redeemed, or for him
to the officer who made the sale, or his
successor in office. At the same time
the redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from whom he seeks to
redeem, and serve with his notice to the
officer: {{) a certified copy of the
docket of judgment under which he
claims the right to redeem, or, if he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a
memorandum of the record thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an assignment,
properly acknowledged or proved, where
the same is necessary to establish his
claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his
agent showing the amount then actually
due on the lien.
[1-3] In analyzing the Griffiths' contention that the provisions of the just quoted rule have not been complied with, there
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are certain principles relating to mortgages
and their foreclosure to be considered.
The main purpose of a mortgage is to insure the payment of the debt for which is
stands as security; and foreclosure is allowed when necessary to carry out that
objective. 1 But foreclosure is in the nature of a forfeiture, which the law does
not favor. 2
The proceeding is one in
equity 3 in which principles of equity should
be applied consistent with the above stated
purpose; and neither the mortgage nor the
foreclosure should be used as an instrument of oppression. Accordingly, the law
provides for the six-month redemption period to give the debtor an opportunity to
pay his debt and salvage his property. 4

er's rights had, in fact, been properly assigned to the defendant; nor that the defendant made the tender of the correct
amount due for redemption one day before
the redemption period expired. When so
advised they did not then indicate any
ground whatsoever for rejecting the tender.
If they had done so, defendants
would have had 24 hours to remedy any
technical deficiency. Under such circumstances, the law is that if one fails to state
his objections to a tender, he is deemed to
have waived them. 8

[4,51 Consistent with the foregoing,
rules and statutes dealing with redemption
are regarded as remedial in character and
should be given liberal construction and
application to permit a property owner who
can pay his debts to do so, and thus make
his creditor whole, and save his property.
Therefore, if a debtor, acting in good
faith, has substantially complied with the
procedural requirements of the rule in such
a manner that the lender mortgagee is not
injured or adversely affected, and is getting what he is entitled to. the law will not
aid in depriving the mortgagor of his property for mere failing short of exact compliance with technicalities. 5

In view of the undisputed facts as recited herein it is our opinion that the Griffiths were not justified in refusing to accept the tendered payment for redemption;
and that upon receipt of that sum they are
obliged to release the mortgage. It is so
ordered. Costs to defendants (appellants).

[6] Applying the principles just set
forth to the facts here: it will be seen that
none of the matters relied upon by the
Griffiths as stated in the letter of June 20
could have had any adverse effect upon
them. It is plainly apparent that they were
excuses to justify a preconceived desire to
refuse to accept the tender and release the
mortgage. They did not then, and do not
now, question that the debtor redemptionFirst yat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. Raymond, SO Utah 151. 57 P.2d 1401. 1405.
2. See Jensen, v. yuisen, 26 Utah 2d 06. 4S5
P.2d 673 (1071) ; Jacobson v. Sican. 3 Utah
2d 50, 27S P.2d 294.
3. First yat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. Hay
mond, SO Utah 151, 57 P.2d 1401. 1405.

H E X R I O D , C. J., and T U C K E T 7 , ELL E T T and MAUGHAX. ]]., concur.

E.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c)

Rule 56. Summary j u d g m e n t .
{&) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory j u d g m e n t may. at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary j u d g m e n t in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
lb) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory j u d g m e n t is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c> Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if a n y show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and t h a t the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A s u m m a r y judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated, on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the h e a r i n g of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts t h a t appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which t h e amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action t h e facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
{e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as wrould be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the m a t t e r s stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court m a y permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, a n s w e r s to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party m a y not rest upon the mere allegations
1
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shall state t h a t all right, title and interest which the debtor h a d in and to such
property on the day the execution or attachment was levied, and any right,
title and interest since acquired, is transferred to the purchaser.
(7^ Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to the
purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: iA< a particular description of the
real property sold: (B) the price paid by the purchaser for each lot or parcel if
sold separately: <C) the whole price paid: (D) a statement to the effect that all
right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to the property is
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where such sale is subject to
redemption t h a t fact shall be stated also. A duplicate of such certificate shall be
filed for record by the officer in the office of the recorder of the county. The real
property sold shall be subject to redemption, except where the estate sold is
less t h a n a leasehold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which event said sale
is absolute.
(j) Redemption of real property from, sale.
' 1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to redemption, or any part
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their successors
in interest: (A) the judgment debtor: (B) a creditor having a lien by judgment,
mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or on some share or part thereof,
subsequent to t h a t on which the property was sold.
(2) Redemption;
how made. The person seeking redemption may make
payment of the amount required to the person from whom the property is being
redeemed, or for such person to the officer who made the sale, or such officer's
successor in office. At the same time the redemptioner must produce to the
officer or person from whom the redemptioner seeks to redeem, and serve with
the notice to the officer: < A) a certified copy of the judgment under which the
redemptioner claims the right to redeem, or, if the redemptioner redeems upon
a mortgage or other lien, a copy eertiried by the recorder; (B> an assignment,
properly acknowledged or proved where the same is necessary to establish the
claim; < 0 an affidavit by the redemptioner or an authorized agent showing the
amount then actually due on the judgment, mortgage or other lien.
<3^ Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be redeemed
within six months after the sale by paying the amount of the purchase with a
surcharge of 6 percent thereon in addition, together with the amount of any
assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for tire insurance and necessary
maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the property.which
the purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase, with interest at the
lawful rate on such other amounts, and. if the purchaser is also a creditor
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, other than the
judgment under which said purchase was made, the amount of such other lien,
with interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded for
redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption may pay
the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court
out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was issued, and at the
same time tile with the court and serve upon the purchaser a petition setting
forth the item or items demanded to which the redemptioner objects, together
with the grounds of objection: and thereupon the court shall enter an order
fixing a time for hearing of such objections. A copy of the order fixing time for
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than five days before the day
of hearing. Upon the hearing of the petition the court shall enter an order
determining the amount required for redemption, [n the event an additional
amount to t h a t theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the person seeking
redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount within 7 days. The
purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper certiticate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the court for redemption.
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any
other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days after the last
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I SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

PENNY BROCKBANK,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES L. BROCKBANK,
Respondent.

ORDER CONCERNING CROSS
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BY THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AND
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT
Civil No.: 954700226DA

PENNY BROCKBANK,

Judge: Bruce K. Halliday

Third Party Plaintiff,
Vs.

CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a
CHERYL HUNSAKER.
Third Party Defendant.

THIS MATTER is before the Court pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment
submitted by Third Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant.

Third Party Plaintiff

submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 23, 1999. Third Party
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party
Plaintiff, and a Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant submitted a Motion

for Summary Judgment dated January 21, 2000. Third Party Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party Defendant, and a
Memorandum in support thereof.

Third Party Defendant's Memorandum also was

submitted in opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Court's file was not available to the Court as this case is on appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Court requested, and received, copies of these pleadings. The Court has
reviewed these pleadings, and the case law cited by the parties. The Court has entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows:
1. Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied and
dismissed.
2. The Assignment filed for record in the Carbon County Recorder's Office at Book
425 page 821 is hereby declared, and ordered, void, and of no effect.
3. The Warranty Deed filed for record in the Carbon County Recorder's Office at
Book 425 Page 822 is hereby declared void, and ordered, void, and of no effect.
4. Respondent is hereby restored ownership of the real property located at 48 East
100 North, Price, Utah, more particularly described as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Corner of
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running Eat
50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence West 50 feet; thence
North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning.
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and
across the following described tract of land:
Beginning at a point 209 feet East of the Northwest Corner of
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running

thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence West 10
feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning.
5. Respondent is hereby restored to possession of the real property located at 48
East 100 North, Price, Utah.
6. Respondent is hereby restrained, and enjoined, and shall not grant, bargain, sell,
convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or sign
any document to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien,
transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price,
Carbon County, Utah, or any interest in said property, or to alter, amend, or change the
status of the title thereto, or to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage,
encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or sign any document to grant, bargain,
sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed
any property interest, including, but not limited to the right of redemption allowed by Rule
69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to take any action which would allow any other
person, firm, corporation, partnership, or entity, to make any claim on, for, against, or to
the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Carbon County, Utah.
7. The real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah remains subject to
the judicial lien implemented^ previous orders of the Court.

DATED this JZ^J^I

of

t^^^2-^

, 2000.

District Court Judge
myfiles\brockbankPennyVord.mot.sum.jud\5-12-00
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

PENNY BROCKBANK,
Petitioner,

vs.
JAMES L BROCKBANK,
Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BY THIRD PARTY
PLAINTIFF AND THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT

PENNY BROCKBANK,

Civil No.: 954700226DA

Third Party Plaintiff,

Judge: Bruce K. Halliday

Vs.
CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a
CHERYL HUNSAKER.
Third Party Defendant.

THIS MATTER is before the Court pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment
submitted by Third Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant.

Third Party Plaintiff

submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 23, 1999. Third Party
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party
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Plaintiff, and a Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant submitted a Motion
for Summary Judgment dated January 21, 2000. Third Party Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party Defendant, and a
Memorandum in support thereof.

Third Party Defendant's Memorandum also was

submitted in opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Court's file was not available to the Court as this case is on appeal to the Utah Court Of
Appeals. The Court requested, and received, copies of these pleadings. The Court has
reviewed these pleadings, and the case law cited by the parties. The Court now makes
and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. A Supplemental Decree was entered awarding, inter alia, alimony to Third Party
Plaintiff, real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah (hereinafter referred to as
48 East), to Respondent, and establishing Third Party Plaintiff a lien in favor of Third Party
Plaintiff against all real property awarded to Respondent.
2. The real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah, is more particularly
described as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Corner of
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running Eat
50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence West 50 feet; thence
North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning.
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way o\jer and
across the following described tract of land:
Beginning at a point 209 feet East of the Northwest Corner of
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running
Page 2 of 10

thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence West 10
feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning.
3. Third Party Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interest with the Carbon County Recorder
concerning 48 East on October 28, 1997.
4. Respondent was restrained and enjoined from conveying any interest in real
property. This restraint was imposed by an Order dated September 22, 1998, labeled,
"Order on Order to Show Cause Heard September 1, 1998."
5. 48 East was sold at a sheriffs sale to Third Party Plaintiff.
6. Respondent executed an Assignment (Exhibit A attached to Third Party Plaintiffs
Memorandum) to Third Party Defendant, assigning his right of redemption, pursuant to
Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning the sheriffs sale of 48 East . This
Assignment was filed in the records of the Carbon County Recorder's Office at Book 425
Page 821 (Entry #71125).
7.

Respondent executed a Warranty Deed (Exhibit B attached to Third Party

Plaintiffs Memorandum) to Third Party Defendant, deeding his interest in 48 East. This
Warranty Deed was filed in the records of the Carbon County Recorder's Office at Book
425 Page 822 (Entry #71126).
8. Respondent's transfer of 48 East by both the Assignment and the Warranty Deed
were in contravention of the restraining order implemented in the Order dated September
22, 1998 - that is, Respondent's execution of the Assignment and Warranty Deed were
in contempt of the Court's restraining order implemented in the order dated September 22,
1998.
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9. Third Party Defendant redeemed 48 East.
10. The value of 48 East, as of the date of redemption, was at least $45,000.
11. Third Party Plaintiff obtained a joinder to the divorce action of Third Party
Defendant by filing a Third Party Complaint, and Motion for Joinder.
12. Third Party Plaintiff alleged a cause of action under the Utah Fraudulent
Transfer Act (Utah Code Annotated Section 25-6-1 et seq.).
13. After the redemption, one payment of the mortgage on 48 East was made from
Respondent's account.
14. At the time of the execution of the Assignment and Warranty Deed, Respondent
and Third Party Defendant had been dating. Third Party Defendant characterized her
relationship with Respondent as "boyfriend and girlfriend."
15. Third Party Defendant paid $100 for the Assignment.
16. Third Party Defendant paid $50 for the Warranty Deed.
17. 48 East was an "asset" within the definition of that term under the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act.
18. Third Party Plaintiff has a claim against Respondent within the definition the
term "claim" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
19. Third Party Plaintiff was a creditor of Respondent's within the definition of the
term "creditor" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
20. Respondent owed a debt to Third Party Plaintiff within the definition of the term
"debt" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
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21. Respondent was a debtor within the definition of the term "debtor" under the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
22. 48 East was property within the definition of the term "property" under the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
23. The Assignment and Warranty Deed was a transfer within the definition of the
term "transfer" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
24.

No value was given by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the

Assignment.
25. No value was given by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the Warranty
Deed.
26. There was no bargained for exchange concerning the transfer of Respondent's
interest in 48 East by the Assignment.
27. There was no bargained for exchange concerning the transfer of Respondent's
interest in 48 East by the Warrnty Deed.
28. Respondent and Third Party Defendant were not parties dealing at arms length.
29. The amount paid by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the Assignment
did not constitute fair market value.
30. The amount paid by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the Warranty
Deed did not constitute fair market value.
31.

The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant did not

involve a willing buyer and a willing seller.
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32. The transfer of 48 East by Respondent to Third Party Defendant was intended
to place the asset - 48 East - beyond the reach of Third Party Plaintiff.
33. Third Party Plaintiff has established the existence of fraudulent intent on behalf
of Respondent and Third Party Defendant in the transaction between Respondent and
Third Party Defendant.
34. Badges of fraud are present in this case. Those facts evidencing badges of
fraud are:
a. The nature of the relationship between Respondent and Third Party
Defendant;
b. The insignificant monetary amount paid by Third Party Defendant to
Respondent for the Assignment and Warranty Deed;
c. Payment of the mortgage from Respondent's account subsequent to the
Assignment, Warranty Deed, and redemption;
d. Timing of the Assignment and Warranty Deed in relation to the posture
of the divorce case;
e. Respondent's testimony concerning the reason for the Assignment and
Warranty Deed;1
f. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant seemed

Respondent testified that the reason he transferred the property to Third Party
Defendant was because he did not want the property "to be trashed like the apartments were
before I got them back". If Respondent was, in truth, and in fact, transferring away his interest
in the property, he would have no reason to be concerned about the continuing condition of
the property as his interest was terminated. This testimony indicates Respondent's belief that
he would someday, in the future, regain, and/or remain, in possession of the property.
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to be concluded in a hurried manner;
g. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant seemed
to depart from the usual method of business where arms length parties negotiate a
transaction for fair market value;
h.

The fact that Third Party Defendant has not made a claim against

Respondent concerning the funds utilized to exercise the Right of Redemption transferred
by the Assignment in light of the Third Party Complaint against her.
35.

These undisputed facts throw suspicion on the transaction between

Respondent and Third Party Defendant
36.

Neither Respondent nor Third Party Defendant submitted a reasonable

explanation concerning the facts which indicate badges of fraud.
37. Third Party Plaintiff did not waive her right to challenge Respondent's transfer
of 48 East to Third Party Defendant by the Assignment and Warranty Deed.
38. Third Party Defendant has a cause of action against Respondent concerning
the funds delivered by Third Party Defendant to Third Party Plaintiff in exercising the Right
of Redemption transferred by the Assignment.
39. The fact that Third Party Defendant has failed to pursue that cause of action
strengthens this Court's belief that collusion exists between Respondent and Third Party
Defendant concerning the transfer of 48 East, and that the transaction between
Respondent and Third Party Defendant (both the Assignment and Warranty Deed) is
fraudulent.
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40. All of these facts are undisputed.
41. The undisputed facts establish that Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
42. Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to an order declaring the transfer of 48 East from
Respondent to Third Party Defendant pursuant to the Assignment and Warranty Deed are
void.
43. As the Assignment and Warranty Deed are void, title and possession of 48 East
is restored to Respondent.
44. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter
hereof.
Having made the above Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof.
2. The undisputed facts establish that Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
3. Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
4. Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and
dismissed.
5. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant, in the form of
the Assignment and Warranty Deed, is fraudulent.

Page 8 of 10

6. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant, in the form of
the Assignment and Warranty Deedt is void.
7. The Assignment and Warranty Deed purporting to transfer Respondent's Right
of Redemption and title to 48 East are both void.
8. Respondent is entitled to an order:
a. Declaring void the Assignment and Warranty Deed;
b. Restoring Respondent to possession of 48 East;
c. Declaring Respondent to be the owner of record of 48 East;
d. Continuing, and emphasizing, that Respondent continues to be subject
to a restraining order, restraining, and enjoining, Respondent that he not grant, bargain,
sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or
sign any document to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien,
transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price,
Carbon County, Utah, or any interest in said property, or to alter, amend, or change the
status of the title thereto, or to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage,
encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or sign any document to grant, bargain,
sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed
any property interest, including, but not limited to the right of redemption allowed by Rule
69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to take any action which would allow any other
person, firm, corporation, partnership, or entity, to make any claim on, for, against, or to
the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Carbon County, Utah;
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e. Declaring that the property located at 48 East remains subject to the
judicial lien in favor of Third Party Plaintiff implemented by previous orders of this Court.
DATED this ^ f ^ ^ a y of

^^>^ZJ2^

. 2000.

'BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
District Court Judge

myfiies\Brockbank\ffc.mot.surn ]udg\5-12-000
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I.

THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S OBJECITON TO THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOHN E. SCHINDLER#3619
Attorney for Petitioner
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435)637-1783
FAX: (435) 637-5269
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

PENNY BROCKBANK,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES L. BROCKBANK,
Respondent.

THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION
TO THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S
. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No.: 954700226DA

PENNY BROCKBANK,

Judge. Bruce K. Halliday

Third Party Plaintiff,
Vs.
CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a
CHERYL HUNSAKER.
Third Party Defendant.

COMES NOW the Third Party Plaintiff (Penny), and submits the following Objection
to Third Party Defendant's (Rachele), Motion for Summary Judgment.
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BACKGROUND
Penny filed a third party action against Rachele claiming transfers of property by
Respondent to Rachele were fraudulent, and requesting that the alleged fraudulent
transfers be voided.
Penny filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an order determining the
transfers to be void thus restoring title of the property to Respondent. Rachele has filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a determination that Penny has waived any
defect, and the transfers are valid, and dismissing Penny's action.

INTRODUCTION
This Objection is submitted in response to Rachele's Motion for Summary
Judgment. In this Objection Penny argues:
1. That her Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted, or;
2. That Rachele's Motion for Summary Judgment snould be denied, or, in the
alternative;
3. That Penny should be ordered to pay to Rachele the amount paid by Rachele
for the redemption and directing that Penny is thereafter the owner of property.

page z or a

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO ISSUES OF FACT
To prevail on a Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving party must establish that
there are no material issues of fact. Penny notes that Rachele has not contested any of
the fact issues outlined by Penny in her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for
Summary Judgment. Therefore, Penny submits that the uncontested facts outlined by
Penny in her Memorandum are acknowledged, and accepted, by Rachele. Penny does
not dispute any of the material facts alleged by Rachele.1
POINT II
PENNY ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
Penny will not, at this time, repeat the argument presented in her Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Penny notes that the transaction between
Respondent and Rachele carry "badges of fraud" and/or are in contravention of the Utah
Fraudulent Transfer Act.
POINT III
RACHELE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
Rachele has cited United States vs. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah, 1976), and
Bennion vs. Amoss} 530 P. 2d 810 (Utah, 1975) in support of her position. Penny argues
!

The only facts alleged by Rachele in her Memorandum under "Statement of
Undisputed Facts" with which Penny takes issue, is paragraph 4 on page 2, concerning an
alleged informal agreement to not force a sale of the 48 East property. See paragraph 6 of
Penny's Affidavit, attached hereto.
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that both cases are not applicable as they both concern foreclosure actions regarding
mortgages Neither case involves fact scenarios comparable to be case before the Court
There is reference in United States to Rule 69(f) (2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
In United States, defendants served a notice of redemption, and redemption check, one
day prior to the expiration of the six-month redemption period The redemption check was
refused by letter some eight days later reciting, as reasons for the rejecjon, certain
technical deficiencies The Court noted, "It is plainly apparent that they were excuses to
justify a preconceived desire to refuse to accept the tender and release the mortgage"
Tne Court also noted
' Consistent with the foregoing rules and statutes dealing with
redemption are regarded as remedial in character and should
be given liberal construction and application to permit a
property owner who can pay his debts to do so and thus make
his creditor whole and save his property Tnerefore if a
debtor acting in good faith has substantially complied with the
procedural requirements of the rule in such a manner that the
lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely affected and is
getting what he is entitled, to, the law will not aid in depriving
the mortgagor of his property for mere falling short of exact
compliance with technicalities"
The Court held that under the undisputed facts the refusal of the tender for
redemption was not justified, stating, "Under such circumstances, the law is that if one fails
to state his objections to a tender, he is deemed to have waived them " In other words,
because the tender was rejected based on technicalities, there was a waiver of those
objections due to the acceptance of the tender
Penny submits that there are no facts in this case which would indicate a waiver of
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any "technicalities."
The problem with accepting the Respondent's assignment to Rachele is that such
assignment allows property, subject to the Court's jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the
Decree, to be removed from the Court's jurisdiction, and away from Penny's ability to
enforce the lien awarded in the Decree. This Court has previously indicated that the
purpose for the lien in the Decree, was to give Penny the ability to enforce the award of
alimony. Such shenanigans should not be tolerated by this Court either as a matter of law,
or as a matter of equity.
POINT IV
EQUITIES
Rachele argues that it is not equitable for Penny to profit by retaining the amount
paid by Rachele when she redeemed the property.
Penny's response is that equity leans more heavily in her favor. In this case,
Rachele and Respondent conspired to remove the subject property from Penny's lien.
Certainly Penny had no involvement in the transaction between Respondent and Rachele.
If Rachele was not completely aware of the entire situation, her claim is against
Respondent. Rachele was in a position to know, or at least determine, all of the facts.
Certainly she was aware of Respondent's divorce, and the terms of the Decree particularly with reference to the lien. Rachele testified that there was discussion involving
Rachele, Respondent, and Respondent's counsel, when the assignment and Warranty
Deed were executed.
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Penny submits that if the equities were weighed, the totality of the circumstances
indicate that the argument, certainly, should go in her favor. It is reasunaule to conclude,
from the undisputed facts before the Court, that Respondent and Rachele conspired to
remove the subject property from the lien imposed by the Court in the Decree. Penny does
not believe that either law, or equity, dictate that she should end up on the short and of
that stick.
Rachele has not asserted a claim against Respondent. Obviously, Rachele has a
claim against Respondent. Penny should not be hurt by Rachele's refusal to pursue an
obvious, and logical, claim.
POINT V
Assuming the Court finds merit in Rachele's equitable argument because she is out
$16,653, Penny is willing to pay that amount to her on condition that the Court then
determine Respondent's redemption time has expired, and that Penny now is the owner
of the subject property.
Penny's position is, and consistently has been, that the Assignment and Warranty
Deed are ineffectual as they are the product of fraud. The redemption should be credited
to Respondent, as if it were he who performed the redemption. By so holding, Respondent
is receiving credit, as he should, for the redemption, and the title to the property is restored
to him.
In the alternative, as indicated herein, and in Penny's Affidavit, she is willing to pay
$16,653, which Rachele paid for the redemption, and proceed as if the redemption had not

Paae 6 of 8

occurred Under that scenario, Penny should be held to be the owner of the property
In short, Penny argues that neither Respondent nor Third Party Plaintiff should
benefit from their fraud

Either their action, i e the Assignment and Warranty Deed, is

fraudulent as to Penny, and the Court should restore the status quo - that is, allow credit
for Respondent concerning the redemption price, and restore title to him - or, the Court
should compensate Rachele by allowing Penny to pay to Rachele the amount of money
she is out (i e $16,653), hold that the redemption did not occur, and determine that Penny
is the owner of the property

CONCLUSION
In conclusion Penny urges the following
1 That her Motion for Summary Judgment be granted,2 or,
2 That Rachele's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted by directing Penny to
pay $16 653 to Rachele, determining that Respondent had failed to exercise his right of
redemption, and directing that Penny is the owner of the subject property
DATED this 7

day of

,2000

JOHN E SCHINDLER
Attorney for Petitioner

:

The affect of this order would be to restore the status quo prior to the Assignment and
Warranty Deed, such that the redemption was exercised by Respondent, title to the subject
property is restored to him, and he got credit for the amount paid through the redemption
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J.

AFFIDAVIT OF CHERYL RACHELE IN SUPPORT OF THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; and IN OPPOSITION TO THIRD PARTY
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

jAN25i:o

l

-J

BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
rVTJE & YOUNG
Attorneys for James L. Brockbank and Cheryl Rachele
226 W. 2230 North

P.O. Box 657
Provo, Utah, 8^603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PENNY BROCKBANK,
Petitioner,
v.
J.AMES L. BROCKBANK,
Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT OF CHERYL RACHELE IN
SUPPORT OF THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; and IN
OPPOSITION TO THIRD P.ARTY
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION1 FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. 954700226DA
Judge: Bruce K. Halhday

PENNY BROCKBANK,
Third party plaintiff,
v.
CHERYL RACHELE,
Third Party Defendant.

I3SQ

3> - c ^ ^ *~* ^- v ~ ~^:: * : ^
STATE OF UTAH
County of Carbon

)
:ss,
)

CHERYL RACHELE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of 21 and all matters attested hereto are based upon first hand

knowledge.
2.

1 did not receive any funds which I generated to redeem the 48 East Property from

James Brockbank.
3.

L enjoy ftill possession of the 48 East Property.

4.

My redemption of the 48 East Property was not intended to defraud Penny

Brockbank. I intended to by the property for SI5,000.
5.

Penny Brockbank has never tried to return the redemption check to me, has not

objected to the payment, has not placed any restriction on reciept of the payment, nor any portion
of the redemption price.
DATED this ^ d a y of January, 2000.

Ciii^L/C fowl*—
CHERYL RACHELE

- I
Subscribed and sworn before me this /- t day of January, 2000.

rr'i/iJi

1

/

NOTARY PUBLIC
H:\COMMO>AMAFtKvBRENT^aROCKBAN\ArtU»v1i of Owr?l fUchele.doc

CLAY G. H0LBR00K
A
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COMBINED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S CORSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
and IN OPPOSITION TO THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

&V25..J
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVTE & YOUNG
Attorneys for James L. Brockbank and Cheryl Rachele
226 W. 2230 North
P.O. Box 657
Provo, Utah, 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000

.

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PENNY* BROCKBANK,
Petitioner,
v.
JAMES L. BROCKBANK,
Respondent.

COMBINED MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; and IN
OPPOSITION TO THIRD P.ARTY
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 954700226DA
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday

PENNY BROCKBANK,
Third party plaintiff,
v.
CHERYL RACHELE,
Third Party Defendant.

Comes now the Third Party Defendant Cheryl Rachele, by and through counsel of record,
and herby submits this Combined Memorandum in Support of Third Party Defendant's Cross- •
Motion for Summary Judgment; and in Opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

James Brockbank and Penny Brockbank are parties to a divorce action, which is

the primary case herein. (Record at 1.)
2.

A Supplemental Decree was entered on or about February 18, 1998. (Record at

3.

Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Supplemental Decree, James was awarded certain

289.)

property, including the real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah (hereinafter
sometimes "the 48 East Property.") (Record at 292.)
4.

James and Penny had an informal agreement that Penny would not force a sale of

the 48 East Property. (Record at 944, ffi| 2-4.)
5.

Based on the Supplemental Decree wherein a judgment wras entered in the

approximate amount of S42,832.88,] Penny caused a Writ of Execution to be levied on James' 48
East Property. (Record at 944.)
6.

The value of 48 East, as of the date of redemption, was at least $45,000. (Penny's

Uncontested Material Facts ^j 7).
1

Paragraph 10A of the Decree provided a judgment of $3,371.88. Paragraph 10B
of the Decree provided a judgment of $39,461.00, which total is $42,832.88.

7.

At the sheriffs sale of the 48 East Property on December 23, 1998, Penny credit

bid the amount of Fifteen Thousand (SI 5,000) and took possession of the property. (Record at
491.)
8.

The mortgage remaining on the 48 East Property at the time of the sheriffs sale

was approximately $2,000 to S3,000. (Record at 944, ] 4.)
9.

James did not have funds available to redeem the 48 East Property. (Record at

945,ffl|7,9.)
10.

Because James understood that Penny owned the 48 East Property subsequent to

the sheriffs sale, James did not believe that his assignment of the right of redemption would
violate the court's order restraining him from conveying or pledging his real property. (Record
at 946, ^10; 1116, pp. 152-154.)
11.

James thereafter on January 5, 1999, assigned the right of redemption to Cheryl

Rachele for S100. (Record at 485; Penny's Uncontested Material Facts 1 9a.)
12.

Cheryl Rachele redeemed the property from Penny for SI6,653, which included

the bid price of S15,000, plus interest, plus attorney's fees. (Record at 486-487.)
13.

Thus, Cheryl paid (combining price paid to buy right of redemption and to

redeem) 516,753 for the 48 East property. (James Statement of Undisputed Factsffi[11-12.)
14.

Penny accepted the amount of 516,653 from Cheryl as the redemption price of the

48 East Property. (Record at 486-487, 860-861.)

15.

The amount of 515,000 was credited to Penny's judgment against James. (Record

at 860-861.) (See Stipulation and Order to Release Funds and Satisfy Judgment against James L.
Brockbank, page 2.)
16.

Cheryl has possession and control of the 48 East Property. (Record at 1116, page

123,1ns. 17-18.)
17.

Cheryl owns the 48 East Property.

18.

On January 6, 1999. Penny added Cheryl as a defendant claiming fraud in James'

assignment to Cheryl. (Record at 480.)
19.

At no time has Penny returned or attempted to return the amount of the

redemption price to Cheryl. (Affidavit of Cheryl Rachele.)
ARGUMENT
L

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT
CHERYL RACHELE IS PROPER BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
DEMONSTRATE THAT PENNY BROCKBANK WAIVED ANY OBJECTION
TO THE ASSIGNMENT AND REDEMPTION BY ACCEPTING THE
REDEMPTION PRICE PAID.
Penny's acceptance of the redemption price, attorney's fees, and statutory interest

establish her waiver of the right to challenge James' assignment of his right of redemption.
When Penny initiated a sheriffs sale, credit bid at the sale what she asserted to be a fair value,
and then accepted Cheryl's money to redeem the property, Penny waived the right to challenge
James' assignment to Cheryl. Moreover, by accepting the redemption price without reservation,
Penny confirmed that Cheryl would have ownership of the property. Penny's actions lead only

to one reasonable legal conclusion—that Penny waived her right to challenge James' assignment
of his right of redemption to Cheryl.
The fact that Penny has waived her objections to Cheryl's redemption of the 48 East
Property is illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court's holding in U.S. v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506
(Utah 1976). In Looselv, the United States Small Business Administration brought a foreclosure
action on a service station after the lessors, the Looselys, failed to repay a Small Business
Administration loan. Id. at 507. The Griffiths purchased the service station property at the
sheriffs sale. The Looselys assigned their right of redemption to the Hammons, who in turn
assigned the right to Basic Investment, Inc. Basic Investment exercised the right of redemption
one-day before the six-month redemption period expired by serving the notice of redemption and
check for the redemption amount on the Griffiths' attorney. The Griffiths accepted the
redemption price. Eight days later, the Griffiths returned the redemption check on the grounds
that the attempt to redeem was invalid. Id.
The Supreme Court concluded that the redemption was valid because the redemption
statute had been substantially complied with. The Court further held that the Griffiths had
waived their objections to the redemption because they did not object to the redemption at the
time it was made. Id. at 508. The Court stated: "the law is that if one fails to state his objections
to a tender, he is deemed to have waived them."2 IcL

2
This is a significant point in the appeal of this matter. Counsel has repeatedly urged upon
the Court the legal principle that once the period of redemption expires, the individual who
purchases at the sheriffs sale or the individual who subsequently redeems acquires all right, title,
and interest to the property. The Loosely case establishes this principle without question.

In the present case, Penny accepted the redemption price from Cheryl. Penny did not
object to Cheryl's tender at the time Penny accepted the SI6,653 from Cheryl. Penny failed to
state any objection to the redemption on any grounds that the redemption or the assignment was
invalid. Indeed, Penny accepted the benefit of Cheryl's redemption—Penny's judgment against
James was credited the amount of the redemption price. (Record at 860-861.) Penny has never
returned or attempted to return the redemption price to Cheryl. These facts lead to only one
reasonable legal conclusion: Penny waived any objection to the assignment and subsequent
redemption. The case law recognizes this waiver. Consequently, this Court should not allow
Penny to take the benefit of the redemption, and then claim that the redemption was fraudulent.
See also Bennion v. Amoss, 530 P.2d S10, 812 (Utah 1975) ('Vhere a redemption of the
property has taken place, the person redeeming is estopped from asserting any invalidity to the
sale").
Moreover, when Penny accepted the redemption price from Cheryl, Penny also ratified
James' assignment of the right of redemption to Cheryl.3 In a broad sense, ratification is
defmed as "the confirmation of a previous act done either by the party himself or by "another."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,

(1991), page 872; see also, Bullock v. State Dept. of

Transportation, 966 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (a party's retention of the fruits of
a transaction serves as an implied ratification of that transaction). It would be unlawful and

3

In the Stipulation and Order to Release Funds and Satisfy Judgment against James L.
Brockbank, Penny's judgment against James was credited the amount of the redemption price.
(Record at 860-861.)

certainly inequitable for Penny to enjoy the benefits of the assignment by accepting the
redemption price, and then allow Penny to claim the assignment and the redemption were a fraud
committed upon her.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT
CHERYL RACHELE IS PROPER BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
EVIDENCE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT WAS NOT A FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER.
Penny does not present any evidence that James or Cheryl intended to defraud her by

assigning the right of redemption or that the assignment and redemption were not for reasonably
equivalent value. The Court must find fraudulent intent in order to invalidate the assignment.
Intent may be inferred from certain circumstances, commonly referred to as "badges of fraud."
However, those circumstances are not present in this case. Because there are no indicia of
fraudulent intent, summary judgment should be entered in favor of Cheryl.
A.

Cheryl's Purchase of the Assignment and Her Redemption of the Property
Were for Fair Market Value.

Cheryl purchased the right to redeem the 48 East Property for SI00. This purchase did
not give her possession of the property. To acquire full title and possession of the property,
Cheryl was required to obtain and to pay to Penny the SI5,000 credit bid made at the execution
sale, plus costs associated with the sale, plus interest, totaling 516,653. The right of redemption
purchased by Cheryl for SI00 amounted to an option to buy. This option merely allowed Cheryl
to purchase the property at the amount Penny determined to be the fair market value—the
515,000 which Penny bid for the 48 East Property.

At the sheriffs sale, Penny credit bid SI 5,000, which was the amount she deemed to be
the fair market value of the property. (Record at 491.) Penny should not now be heard to
complain that Cheryl's redemption of the property for 515,000, plus fees and statutory costs, was
a fraud. Penny attempted and succeeded in obtaining the same piece of property for SI 5,000.
Penny has previously testified that, in her view, there was nothing unfair about the 515,000 price
she paid for the 48 East Property. (Record 4:03:24.) Penny appears to present the argument
that, as a judgment creditor, she had the right to take advantage of the judgment debtor by taking
his property for one third of its fair market value. But inconsistently, after having pocketed the
SI 5,000 redemption price, Penny argues that the redemption of the property for SI 5,000 is unfair
and fraudulent as to her. If 515,000 is a fair price for the 4S East Property—as Penny
maintains—then the redemption price of SI5,000 is also a fair price. Penny's contention—that
the amount Cheryl paid to redeem the property is so unfair as to create a fraud—is disingenuous,
especially because Penny set the price of the redemption by bidding SI 5,000 at the sale and
accepted the 515,000 for redemption.
The case Tech-Fluid Services Inc. v. Galivan Operating Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), is helpful in recognizing that the amount bid at a sheriffs sale is a fair market value
of the property to be redeemed. In Tech-Fluid, Tech-Fluid commenced an action to foreclose its
mechanic's lien in the amount of S69,708 on an oil and gas well owned by Paiute Oil and Mining
Corporation. Id. 1330. At the sheriffs sale, Tech-Fluid purchased the property for 54,000.
After the sale, Paiute assigned its right of redemption to Wind River Resources Corporation.
Wind River redeemed the property now owned by Tech-Fluid for 54,000 plus cosl and statutory

fees. Tech-Fluid contended that Wind River should have paid the entire amount of Tech-Fluid's
lien—the amount of S69,703, rather than the S4,000 redemption price—because the property was
valued at more than the redemption price and there remained a debt by the original owner. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument:
Tech-Fluid is bound by its choices, including the decision to bid only S4,000 on the well.
As the only bidder at the sale, Tech-Fluid established the value of the well for redemption
purposes and placed itself in the predicament it now finds itself. [Citations omitted.]
According to Rule 69(f)(3), Wind River was only obligated to pay what Tech Fluid [sic]
paid plus the specified interest.
Id, at 1335.
Penny set the credit bid at one-third the appraised value of the property. She did this so
that only SI5,000 would be applied to James' debt to her. Thus, Penny hoped to obtain a
530,000 windfall when the redemption period expired. Now Penny argues that Cheryl's
purchase of the right to redeem and ultimate redemption of the property for 515,000 is
fraudulent. The amount Cheryl paid for the assignment and for the redemption price was the
fair value of the property, which Penny established by credit bidding the value of S15,000 at the
sheriffs sale. Pursuant to Tech-Fluid, the only reasonable legal conclusion is that the 515,000
paid to redeem the 48 East Property is adequate compensation for property for which Penny
credit bid 515,000.

B.

Cheryl's Purchase of the Assignment and Subsequent Redemption of the 48
East Property Were Not Done With "Actual Intent" to Hinder, Delay or
Defraud Penny.

Utah Code Section 25-6-5(2) outlines the factors which may be relevant to determine
"actual intent." A review of the facts of this case demonstrates that there is no evidence of actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud Penny.
1. Cheryl is not an insider. Utah Code Section 25-6-2(7)(a) defines an insider as "a
relative of the debtor." Cheryl is not related to James. Thus, under the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, Cheryl is not an insider.
2. Cheryl maintains possession of the 48 East Property. Cheryl has full possession
and control of the property, with the exception of one mortgage payment made by Brockbank
appraisal. Because Cheryl has possession of the property, because James does not use the
propeny nor receive any financial gain from the property, there is no "badge of fraud." Penny's
allegation that James anticipates the return of the property is disputed and is not sufficient to
support a legal conclusion that the assignment and redemption were fraudulent.
3. The assignment and redemption were not concealed from Penny, and the
assignment was not substantially all of James' assets. James' assignment of his right of
redemption to Cheryl was not concealed from Penny. In fact, as previously explained, Penny
accepted the redemption price and credited her judgment against James in that amount.
Additionally, the assignment of James' right of redemption was not an assignment of
substantially all of his assets. James owned other real property. In fact, Penny's judgment

against James was paid in full by the sale of his real property located at 38 East 100 North.
(Record at 860.)
4. James did not abscond, nor did he become insolvent as a result of the assignment
of the right of redemption. James did not abscond. Additionally, James did not become
insolvent by the assignment of the right of redemption. As previously explained, Penny's
judgment against James was paid in full shortly after the 48 East Property was redeemed.
5. The assignment did not place James' assets beyond Penny's reach. Penny
purchased the 48 East Property at the sheriffs sale, subject to the right of redemption. Thus,
Penny—as a creditor of James'—had the 48 East Property in her hands. By purchasing the
property at the sheriffs sale, Penny acquired all right, title, interest and claim to the 48 East
Property, subject to the right of redemption. Significantly, by purchasing the 48 East Property,
Penny exercised her right of execution and satisfied her lien as against the 48 East Property.
Penny elected to sell the 48 East Property in satisfaction of her judgment lien as against that
property. As a matter of law, the exercise of a right of redemption in that circumstance cannot be
a fraud.4

4
Cheryl notes that the issue of whether the assignment violated the Court's order
prohibiting James from conveying or pledging real property is before the Utah Court of Appeals
at this time. This issue is not material to Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment because
Penny's waiver and ratification of the assignment are dispositive. However, Cheryl contends
that this disputed issue of fact and law precludes the granting of Penny's motion for summary
judgment.

CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts clearly evidence that Penny has waived any objection to the
assignment of the right of redemption and the subsequent redemption because Penny accepted
the redemption price. Because Penny made no objections to Cheryl's tender of the redemption
price (indeed, Penny accepted the money), the law deems that Penny has waived her objections.
Also, because Penny accepted the redemption price, she ratified James' assignment of the right
of redemption. To allow Penny to claim the redemption was a fraud, when she accepted the
benefit therefrom without objection, would be unlawful and inequitable.
The undisputed facts also indicate that the assignment of the right of redemption was not
a fraudulent transfer. The assignment and redemption were for reasonably equivalent value, as
established by Penny, and were not made with intent to hinder or delay Penny. In fact, the
sheriffs sale and the redemption resulted from Penny exercising her rights as a creditor to satisfy
her judgment lien as against the 48 East Property.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Third Party Defendant Cheryl Rachele respectfully
requests this Court to deny Third Party Plaintiff Penny Brockbank's motion for summary
judgment and to enter summary judgment in favor of Third Party Defendant Cheryl Rachele.
Dated this 2!

day of January 2000.

feRENT D. Y$UN(7
Attorney for Third Farty Defendant
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THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

FILED
JOHN E. SCHINDLER#3619
Attorney for Petitioner
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435)637-1783
FAX: (435) 637-5269
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

PENNY BROCKBANK,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES L BROCKBANK,
Respondent.

THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THIRD
PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT
Civil No : 954700226DA

PENNY BROCKBANK,

Judge: Bruce K. Halliday

Third Party Plaintiff,
Vs.

CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a
CHERYL HUNSAKER.
Third Party Defendant.

COMES NOW the Third Party Plaintiff and submits the following Memorandum in
support of her Motion for Summary Judgment.
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BACKGROUND
This matter was initiated by a Third Party Complaint dated January 6, 1999

Said

Complaint alleges that the transfer of the property described in the Complaint, by
Respondent to Third Party Defendant, was a fraudulent transaction and should be voided

INTRODUCTION
The parties were divorced by Decree in the underlying action

A Supplemental

Decree was entered awarding alimony to Third Party Plaintiff, awarding certain real
property to Respondent, and awarding a lien to Third Party Plaintiff on the real property
awarded to Respondent to secure amounts determined to be due by Respondent to Third
Party Plaintiff, including alimony
A subsequent order was entered restraining and enjoining Respondent, from
conveying his interest in real property (See Order dated September 11, 1998)
Respondent failed to pay the amounts ordered to be paid to Third Party Plaintiff by
Respondent Third Party Plaintiff obtained a Writ of Execution directing the sale of real
property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah (hereinafter referred to as "48 East")
Third Party Plaintiff purchased 48 East at the Sheriffs Sale Respondent executed
an Assignment (See attached Exhibit A ), and a Warranty Deed (See attached Exhibit B )
The Third Party Defendant redeemed the property, pursuant to the Assignment and
Warranty Deed, and Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Third Party Plaintiff initiated the pending action seeking an order voiding the
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Assignment and Warranty Deed, thereby restoring title of the property to Respondent.
Presently before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by Third
Party Plaintiff. Said Motion is supported by Third Party Plaintiffs Affidavit (attached to
Motion for Summary Judgment), and exhibits submitted as attachments hereto as well as
exhibits to the Memorandum. By this Motion, Third Party Plaintiff argues that there are no
issues of material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS
Third Party Plaintiff submits the following facts, which she asserts are not contested.
1. A Supplemental Decree was entered:
A. Awarding alimony to Petitioner;
B. Awarding real property located at 48 East to Respondent (^j 5B);
C.

Awarding Petitioner a lien against all real property awarded to

Respondent to secure the Respondent's alimony obligation (U 10).
2. Third Party Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interest with the Carbon County Recorder
concerning the property at 48 East on October 28, 1997. (See Exhibit A, attached to Third
Party Plaintiffs Affidavit, attached to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.);
2. Respondent was restrained and enjoined from conveying any interest in real
property by an Order dated September 22, 1998, labeled "Order on Order to Show Cause
Heard September 1, 1998" (See paragraph 4). 1
1

Paragraph 4 states: "Respondent is hereby restrained and enjoined from taking any
action to convey or pledge any of the real property awarded him by the Supplemental Decree."
Page 3 of 11

3 48 East was sold at a Sheriffs Sale to Petitioner/Third Party Plaintiff,
4 Respondent executed an Assignment (See attached Exhibit A) concerning his
right of redemption pursuant to Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
5 Respondent executed a Warranty Deed (See attached Exhibit B )
6 Third Party Defendant redeemed 48 East
7 The value of 48 East, as of the date of redemption, was at least $45,000

(See

Third Party Plaintiffs Affidavit, 1J5 )
7 Petitioner initiated the pending action against Third Party Defendant;
8 Third Party Defendant testified at a hearing on March 15, 1999, as follows
A

2

One payment of the mortgage, concerning 48 East, was made from

Respondent's account after the redemption,
B That Respondent and Third Party Defendant have a personal relationship
"as in boyfriend and girlfriend n (See page 118 )
C

That Third Party Defendant paid $100 for the Assignment (See page

121 )
9 Respondent testified at a hearing on March 15, 1999, as follows. 3
A Third Party Defendant paid $100 for the Assignment (See page 146 ),
B Third Party Defendant paid $50 for the Warranty Deed (See page 146 );
C He transferred the property to Third Party Defendant because he did not

2

Attached as Exhibit C is a copy of Third Party Defendant's testimony in total

"Attached as Exhibit D is a copy of Respondent's testimony in total
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want the property (48 East)M

to be trashed like the apartments were before I got them

back " (See page 151 ),
D A payment was made concerning 48 East, to the mortgage holder after
the Assignment and Warranty Deed

This payment was from his account

(See page

159)

ARGUMENT
Point I
NO ISSUES OF FACT
To prevail concerning the pending Motion, Third Party Plaintiff must establish that
there are no material issues of fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Pappas vs. Richfield City, 962 P 2d 63 (Ct App

1S98)
Third Party Plaintiff submits that all of the facts, listed above, have either been
established by written document, or by testimony of opposing parties - i e , Third Party
Defendant and Respondent To prevail on a Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving
party must establish that there are no material issues of fact
Third Party Plaintiff submits that these facts are uncontroverted, and that she,
therefore, has satisfied the first hurdle to obtain an order granting her Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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Point II
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER
The second hurdle facing the moving party in a Motion for Summary Judgment is
to establish that they are entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, based on the
uncontroverted facts Third Party Plaintiff submits that, as a matter of law, based on the
established, uncontroverted facts she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
The Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act is found at Utah Code Annotated Title 25 Chapter
6 Third Party Plaintiff argues that these statutes mandate a ruling in her favor
Utah Code Annotated §25-5-2 contains several definitions which are helpful in
making the conclusion that Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
Those definitions are as follows
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor,
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment,
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim,
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim,
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim,
(S) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of
a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by
agreement a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings,
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership,
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset
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From these statutory definitions the following is clear
1 48 East is an asset,
2 Third Party Plaintiff has a claim against Respondent,
3 Third Party Plaintiff is a creaitor of Respondent,
4 A debt existed between Third Party Plaintiff and Respondent,
5 Respondent is a debtor,
6 48 East was subject to a lien,
7 48 East is "property",
8 Respondent transferred the property (48 East) to Third Party Defendant
Tmrd Party Plaintiff submits the transfer was not for value
"Value is defined at Utah Code Annotated §25-6-4 (1) as follows (1) "Value is given for
a transfer or an obligation if in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is
transferred o^ an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied " In this case, Third Party
Defendant paid Respondent $100 for the Assignment, and $50 for the Warranty Deed
With these transfers, Third Party Defendant received real property valued in at least the
amount of $45,000 Third Party Plaintiff asserts there was not a " bargained for exchange"
between "arms length" parties, which also indicates value was not given by Third Party
Defendant
Third Party Plaintiff argues that the transfer was not for fair market value

Fair

market value is defined as "the amount at which property would change hands between
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and
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both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts " Philip A. vs. Salt Lake City,
983 P 2d 566 (Utah 1999), In Re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P 2d 969 (Utah 1996),
UCA §59-2-102(11)
Courts of this jurisdiction have voided transfers when the transfer of property was
designed to place a debtor's assets beyond reach of the debtor's creditors

Butler vs.

Wilkinson, 740 P 2d 1244 (Utah 1987), Dahnken, Inc. vs. Wilmarth, 726 P 2d 420 (Utah
1986)
In Dahnken the Court stated
Wilmarth's third claim, that the evidence did not support the
trial court's finding that the assignment was maae with actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud Davis' creditors, is also
without merit Although actual fraudulent intent must be shown
to hold a conveyance fraudulent pursuant to § 25-1-7, its
existence may be inferred from the presence of certain indicia
of fraud or "badges of fraud " Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d
287, 291 351 P 2d 959, 962 (1960) Badges of fraud that
pertain to this case are a debtor's (1) continuing in possession
and evidencing the perquisites of prooerty ownership after
having formally conveyed all his interest in the property, (2)
making a conveyance in anticipation of litigation, and (3)
making a conveyance to a family member without receiving fair
consideration Id
"Badges of Fraud" have also been discussed in other cases in Utah The Court of
Appeals in Territorial Savings and Loan Association vs. Baird, 781 P 2d 452 (Ct. App.
1989)4 stated
"[Badges of fraud] are said to be facts which throw suspicion
on a transaction, and which call for an explanation More
simply stated, they are signs or marks of fraud They do not of
4

This case is attached as Exhibit E
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themselves or per se constitute fraud, but they are facts having
a tendency to show the existence of fraud, although their value
as evidence is relative not absolute. They are not usually
conclusive proof; they are open to explanation. They may be
almost conclusive, or they may furnish merely a reasonable
inference of fraud, according to the weight to which they may
be entitled from their intrinsic character and the special
circumstances attending the case. Often a single one of them
may establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent...."
The generally recognized badges of fraud are the lack of
consideration for the conveyance, the transfer of the debtor's
entire estate, relationship between transferor and the
transferee, the pendency or threat of litigation, secrecy or
hurried transaction, insolvency or indebtedness of the
transferor, departure from the usual method of business, the
retention by the debtor of possession of the property, and the
reservation of benefit to the transferor.
"Badges of Fraud," or other indicators of fraud "have been described as facts which
"throw suspicion on a transaction and which call for an explanation. . . facts having a
tendency to show the existence of fraud, although their value as evidence is relative not
absolute. Selvage vs. J J Johnson

& Assoc. 910 P. 2d 1252 (Ct. App. 1996) 5 , citing

Territorial Savings & Loan Association

vs. Baird, supra.

In this case, all of the "badges of fraud" are present - and are uncontroverted facts.
There is a lack of consideration for the conveyance. There is a relationship between the
transferor and the transferee. There is pending litigation. There is a departure from the
usual method of business. There is a reservation of benefit to the transferor. There is.
continued involvement with the transferred property by the transferor in the form of a
payment, and in the form of anticipated return of the property (See Respondent's testimony

5

This case is attached as Exhibit F
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at p 151 of Exhibit D wherein he indicates that he did not "want the property to be trashed
like the apartments were before I got them back ")
Third Party Plaintiff submits that the uncontroverted facts establish that she is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law in that the transfer of 48 East by Respondent to
Third Party Defendant constitutes a fraudulent conveyance as contemplated by the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and applicable case law

CONCLUSION
Third Party Plaintiff has established that both hurdles required by a moving party
to prevail in a motion for summary judgment have been surmounted There are no material
issues of fact

Based on the uncontroverted material issues of fact, Third Party Plaintiff

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
Third Party Plaintiff submits that she is entitled to an order voiding the transfer of
48 East by Respondent to Third Party Defendant thus restoring title of said property to
Respondent
DATED this Q^i

day of

,L

.<> „,

d <

, 1999

j g t f N E SCHINDLER
Attorney for Third Party Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

^/g,

day of
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. 1999, I mailed a

true and correct copy of the above THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT by placing same in the
U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, to Brent D. Young, Attorney for Respondent, 48 North
University Ave. ,P. 0. Box 657, Provo, UT 84603.-.

/ y
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ASSIGNMENT
JAMES L. BROCKBANK hereby assigns, sets over, and transfers all of his right to
redemption pursuant to the Sheriffs Sale which was conducted on 23 December, 1998 at the
Carbon County Courthouse, to CHERYL RACHELE for the sum of FIFTY and no/100
DOLLARS (S50.00) and other good and valuable consideration. The Assignment of the
redemption applies to the following described property, located at 48 East 100 North, Price,
Carbon County, State of Utah:
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE
TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence
West 50 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning.
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and across the following described
tract of land:
Beginning at a point 209 Te^t East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE
TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence
West 10 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning.
Dated this j£jday of January, 1999.

•- *

^TAMES

L. BROCKBANK

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of CARBON )
On the S_ day of January, 1999, personally appeared before me JAMES L.
BROCKBANK, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
he executed the same.
_^/ _
.
,/
KRISTI L. GREEN

NOTARY PUBLIC

itwsERS'.MA»ctBowv6_cJ>o^^»f^^G HQTAHT PUBLIC • STAT? tt UTAH
248 EAST MAIN
P R I C E . UT 8-*501
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THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOHN E. SCHINDLER #3619
Attorney for Petitioner
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435)637-1783
FAX: (435) 637-5269
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

PENNY BROCKBANK,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES L. BROCKBANK,
Respondent.

THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT
CONCERNING THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Civil No.. 954700226DA
Judge- Bruce K. Halliday

PENNY BROCKBANK,
Third Party-Plaintiff,
Vs.
CHERYL RACHELE,
Third Party Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

J

)
-

ss.

COUNTY OF CARBON

)

COMES NOW, PENNY BROCKBANK, and being first duly sworn upon her oath,
deposes and states:

Page 1 of 3

1 Affiant is the Third Party Plaintiff.
2. Affiant's primary position concerning the present pending Motions for Summary
Judgment submitted by Affiant and Third Party Defendant is that the assignment of
Respondent's right of redemption is fraudulent as to Third Party Plaintiff, and, therefore,
of no effect. As the assignment is of no effect, the redemption was as if it were effectuated
by Respondent, and, therefore, title should be restored to Respondent.
3. Affiant understands Third Party Defendant is arguing that Affiant has waived any
right to object to the Assignment. Third Party Defendant argues that she should be made
whole by receiving the amount paid for the redemption.
4 Affiant is willing, as an alternate, or secondary, position, to pay to Third Party
Defendant the amount oaid for the redemption ($16,653), provided Affiant then becomes
the fee simple owner of the prooerty
5

Should the Court consider, as an option, ordering Affiant to repay Third Party

Defendant the amount paid by Third Party Defendant for the redemption, Affiant would not
oppose such an order provided the order also indicated that the redemption did not occur
and that Affiant, upon payment, is vested with the title to the subject property
6 Affiant has reviewed the Third Party Defendant's Memorandum concerning her
Motion for Summary Judgment. Third Party Defendant recites in paragraph 4, on page 2,
of her Memorandum that there was an informal agreement that Affiant would not force a
sale of the 48 East property Affiant denies that there was ever an informal agreement that
she would not force a sale of the 48 East property.
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7

Affiant was not aware of the Assignment from Respondent to Third Party

Defendant until after the tender, and receipt, of the funds to accomplish the redemption
8

Affiant was not aware of the Warranty Deed from Respondent to Third Party

Defendant until after the tender, and receipt, of the funds to accomplish the redemption
DATED this.

^

PENNY BRQCKBANK
Petitionee^

^ay- of

V.

^

fa,

// ^

~ N

i

, 2Q00

JOWN E SCHINDLER
Attorney for Petitioner

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
ss

COUNTY OF CARBON

)

PENNY BROCKBANK being duly sworn upon oath, deposes ard says that she is
the Petitioner in the aoove entitled action that she has read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT and
unders:ards the same is true to her own knowledge except as to matters therein stated on
information and belief, and as to such matters she believes them to be true

myfiles\SrockbankPenny\Aff 3rd Party Mot Sum Judgment
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of

rJ£**-

2000, I mailed a

true and correct copy of the above THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by placing same in the
U S Mail, postage prepaid, to Brent D Young, Attorney for Respondent, 48 North
University Ave., P. 0 Box 657, Provo, UT 84603.

\Wrn t %k m-1r i
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED 2 JUNE
2000

FILED
JUN 0 2 2QQQ
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo'enny Brockbank,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

James L. Brockbank,
Defendant and Aooellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 990547-CA
F I L E D
( J u n e 2, 2000)
2 0 0 0 UT A D D 1 5 3

Seventh District, Price Department
The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday
Attorneys:

3rent D. Young and Laura M. Grossman, Provo, for
Appellant
John E. Schindier, Price, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, 3iliings, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
The trial court issued an order which "restrained and
enjoined [appellant] from taking any action to convey or pledge
any of the real property awarded him by the Supplemental Decree."
Appellant subsequently conveyed a right of redemption and
contemporaneously executed a warranty deed conveying his
remaining interest in the property. Appellant argues the
conveyance of his right of redemption did not violate the court
order because a right of redemption is not an interest in
property subject to the order. As discussed in Knickerbocker v.
Cannon, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996), the purpose of the trial
court's order was "to prevent the parties from removing the
marital assets from the jurisdiction of the [trial] court." Id.
at 976. Appellant's use of a warranty deed to convey an interest
in property is evidenced by the language of the deed: "JAMES L.
BROCKBANK, grantor of Price, County of Carbon, hereby conveys and
warrants to . . . ." Cf. Stucki v. Ellis, 114 Utah 486, 201 P. 2d
486, 490 (1949) (stating best method to convey property interest
is by deed) ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1994) (governing
form of warranty deed: "Conveyances of land may be substantially
in the following form . . . " ) .
Thus, the trial court was
justified in finding appellant in contempt for violating its
order prohibiting him from conveying his real property, and we

need not determine whether appellant also violated the order by
conveying his right of redemption.
Appellant next argues the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering him to serve sixty days in jail1 or obtain a
reconveyance of the property from the third party grantee in
order to purge the contempt finding. In other words, appellant
could choose to either serve time in jail, or he could purge the
contempt finding by obtaining the property back from the third
party to whom he conveyed it--thus restoring the status quo.
Appellant chose to serve thirty days in jail,2 and thus he is no
longer subject to the court's second alternative that he obtain a
reconveyance in order to purge the contempt. Because the trial
court's contempt order has been satisfied, the trial court cannot
impose any further penalties for that contempt and cannot mandate
that the parties take any further action. Therefore, this court
can provide no relief affecting the rights of the parties, and
the issue is moot. See Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119,1)11,
977 P.2d 1218, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
Finally, appellee cross-appeals the trial court's award of
attorney fees, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to award her the entire amount of her requested fees.
In her brief, appellee cites no authority supporting her
position. We '^decline to consider an argument that a party has
failed to adequately brief.Mf State v. Thomas, 1999 UT App
2,Til, 974 P.2d 269 (citation omitted).

1. Under section 78-32-10, "the court may impose a fine not
exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in the county
jail not exceeding 30 days, or both." Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10
(1996) . The parties dispute whether the court had authority to
impose a longer sentence because it found appellant in contempt
on multiple grounds.
2. At oral argument, counsel stated that the trial court reduced
the sixty day sentence to thirty days, and that appellant had
served thirty days in jail.
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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's contempt finding
id award of attorney fees.

./ •

,X>f

*-*rs-_X^-^^

ameia T. Greenwood,
residing Judge

I CONCUR:

TZl/A'o*.^)
'Judith. M. Billings, Judge"

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

Gregory K<Orme, Judge
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I herecy certify thai CP. tne 2nd day of June, 2000, a true and
correct copy of tne attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in
tne Ur.itec. States mail to:
BRENT D. YOUNG
LAUREL M. CROSSMAN
:V:E & YOUNG
226 W 2230 N #110
?0 3CX 657
PRCVC UT 3 4 603
JOHN E. SCI-.INDLER
DEPUTY CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY
120 E MAIN
PRICE UT 34501
a^c a true anc correct copy of tne attached MEMORANDUM DECISION
«as depositee m tne United States mail to tne yucge listec
oelcw:
HCNCRABLE 3RUCE K. HALLIDAY
CAP3CN COUNTY COURT COMPLEX
14 9 E 100 S
PRICE UT 8 4501
,
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